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Preface
Cantor’s theory of cardinality violates common sense. It says, for example, that
all infinite sets of integers are the same size. This thesis criticizes the arguments
for Cantor’s theory and presents an alternative.
The alternative is based on a general theory, CS (for Class Size). CS consists
of all sentences in the first order language with a subset predicate and a less-than
predicate which are true in all interpretations of that language whose domain is
a finite power set. Thus, CS says that less than is a linear ordering with highest
and lowest members and that every set is larger than any of its proper subsets.
Because the language of CS is so restricted, CS will have infinite interpretations.
In particular, the notion of one-one correspondence cannot be expressed in this
language, so Cantor’s definition of similarity will not be in CS, even though it
is true for all finite sets.
We show that CS is decidable but not finitely axiomatizable by characterizing
the complete extensions of CS. CS has finite completions, which are true only
in finite models and infinite completions, which are true only in infinite models.
An infinite completion is determined by a set of remainder principles, which
say, for each natural number, n, how many atoms remain when the universe is
partitioned into n disjoint subsets of the same size.
We show that any infinite completion of CS has a model over the power set
of the natural numbers which satisfies an additional axiom:
OUTPACING. If initial segments of A eventually become smaller
than the corresponding initial segments of B, then A is smaller than
B.
Models which satisfy OUTPACING seem to accord with common intuitions
about set size. In particular, they agree with the ordering suggested by the
notion of asymptotic density.
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1Introduction
1.1 The Problem
This paper proposes a theory of set size which is based on intuitions, naive and
otherwise. The theory goes beyond intuitions, as theories will, so it needs both
justification and defense. I spend very little time justifying the theory; it is so
clearly true that anyone who comes to the matter without prejudice will accept
it. I spend a lot of time defending the theory because no one who comes to the
matter comes without prejudice.
The prejudice stems from Cantor’s theory of set size, which is as old as sets
themselves and so widely held as to be worthy of the name the standard theory.
Cantor’s theory consists of just two principles:
ONE-ONE. Two sets are the same size just in case there is a one-one
correspondence between them.
CANTOR<. A set, x, is smaller than a set, y, just in case x is the
same size as some subset of y, but not the same size as y itself.
A one-one correspondence between two sets is a relation which pairs each
member of either set with exactly one member of the other. For example, the
upper-case letters of the alphabet can be paired with the lower-case letters:
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
So, the standard theory says, the set of upper-case letters is the same size
as the set of lower-case letters. Fine and good.
The standard theory also says that the set of even numbers is the same size
as the set of integers since these two sets can also be paired off one-to-one:
. . . −n . . . −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 . . . n . . .
. . . −2n . . . −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 . . . 2n . . .
1
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Similarly, the standard theory says that the set of positive even integers is
the same size as the set of prime numbers: pair the n-th prime with the n-th
positive even number. In both of these cases, common sense chokes on the
standard theory.
In the first case, common sense holds that the set of integers is larger than
the set of even integers. The integers contain all of the even integers and then
some. So it’s just good common sense to believe there are more of the former
than the latter. This is just to say that common sense seems to follow:
SUBSET. If one set properly includes another, then the first is larger
than the second.
even into the infinite, where it comes up against the standard theory.
Common sense can make decisions without help from SUBSET. Though
the set of primes is not contained in the set of even integers, it is still clear to
common sense that the former is smaller than the latter. One out of every two
integers is even, while the prime numbers are few and far between. No doubt, to
use this reasoning, you need a little number theory in addition to common sense;
but, given the number theory, it’s the only conclusion common sense allows.
The theory proposed here accommodates these bits of common sense rea-
soning. It maintains SUBSET and a few and far between principle and much
else besides. To state this theory, we use three two-place predicates: <, ∼, and
>. If A and B name sets, then
• pA < Bq is read as A is smaller than B,
• pA ∼ Bq is read as A is the same size as B, and
• pA > Bq is read as A is larger than B.
Incidentally, we assume throughout this thesis that the following schemata
are equivalent, item by item, to the readings of the three predicates given above,
assuming that A is the set of α’s and B is the set of β’s:
a. • There are fewer α’s than β’s.
• There are just as many α’s than β’s.
• There are more α’s than β’s.
b. • The number of α’s is less than the number of β’s.
• The number of α’s is the same as the number of β’s.
• The number of α’s is greater than the number of β’s.
c. • The size of A is smaller than the size of B.
• A and B are (or, have) the same size.
• The size of A is larger than the size of B.
1.2. CANTOR’S ARGUMENT 3
Regarding this last group, we emphasize that we are not arguing that there
really are such things as set sizes, nor that there are not really such things.
Statements about sizes can be translated in familiar and long-winded ways into
statements about sets, though we will not bother to do so.
I have identified the standard theory, Cantor’s, with two principles about set
size. The term size, however, is rarely used in connection with Cantor’s theory;
so it might be wondered whether the standard theory is really so standard. In
stating ONE-ONE and CANTOR<, Cantor used the terms power and cardinal
number rather than size. In the literature, the term cardinal number (sometimes
just number) is used most frequently. If someone introduces cardinal number
as a defined predicate or as part of a contextual definition (e.g. “We say that
two sets have the same cardinal number just in case . . . ”), there is no point in
discussing whether that person is right about size.
Though Cantor’s theory is usually taken as a theory of set size, it can also
be taken as just a theory of one-one correspondences. More specifically, saying
that two sets are similar iff they are in one-one correspondence can either be
taken as a claim about size or be regarded as a mere definition. Whether or
not similarity is coextensive with being the same size, the definition is worth
making. The relation picked out is well studied and well worth the study. The
technical brilliance of the theory attests to this: it has given us the transfinite
hierarchy, the continuum problem, and much else. In addition, the theory has
consequences which do not prima facie seem to have anything to do with size
or similarity: the existence of transcendental numbers comes to mind. All of
this is to say that the interest in one-one correspondence has not been sustained
solely by its identification with the notion of size. Hence, denying that they are
the same does not endanger the theory of one-one correspondences, per se.
But most mathematicians and philosophers do not use cardinal number as
a mere abbreviation. They use the term in just the way that we use size and
slide freely among (A), (B), and (C). This is true, in particular, of Cantor, who
offered ONE-ONE as a theory; indeed, he offered an argument for this theory.
1.2 Cantor’s argument
Cantor bases his argument for ONE-ONE on the idea that the size of a set, it’s
cardinal number, depends on neither the particular elements it contains nor on
how those elements are arranged:
The cardinal number, |M |, of a setM (is the general concept which)
arises fromM when we make abstraction of the nature of its elements
and of the order in which they are given. [Cantor, p.86]
But to say that the cardinal number of a set does not depend on certain things
is not to say what the cardinal is. Neither does it insure that two sets have
the same cardinal number just in case they are in one-one correspondence. To
flesh out this notion of double abstraction, Cantor reduces it to a second ab-
straction operator, one which works on the elements of sets rather than the sets
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themselves:
Every element, m, if we abstract from its nature becomes a unit.
[Cantor, p.86]
and so, concludes Cantor:
The cardinal number, |M |, is a set composed of units (which has
existence in our minds as an intellectual image or projection of M .)
[Cantor, p.86]
According to Jourdain, Cantor
distinguised very sharply between an aggregate and a cardinal num-
ber that belongs to it: “Is not an aggregate an object outside us,
whereas its cardinal number is an abstract picture of it in our mind.”
[Cantor, p.80]
I have parenthesized the expressions above where Cantor describes cardinal
numbers as mental entities. Nevertheless, I can only make sense of his arguments
insofar as he treats cardinal numbers as sets: he refers to them as ‘definite
aggregates’, supposes that they have elements, and employs mappings between
cardinal numbers and other sets.
The following three statements seem to express Cantor’s intent:
|M | = { y | ∃x ∈M ∧ y = Abstract(x) }(1.1)
∀x∃y(y = Abstract(x) ∧ Unit(y))(1.2)
∀M∀y(y ∈ |M | → Unit(y))(1.3)
Abstract (x) is to be read as the result of abstracting from the element x,
Unit (x) as x is a unit, and |M | as the cardinal number of M .
So (1.1) gives a definition of cardinal number, in terms of the operation of
abstraction, from which Cantor proves both ONE-ONEa and ONE-ONEb.
M ∼ N → |M | = |N |(ONE-ONEa)
|M | = |N | →M ∼ N(ONE-ONEb)
ONE-ONEa is true, says Cantor, because
the cardinal number |M | remains unaltered if in the place of one
or many or even all elements m of M other things are substituted.
[Cantor, p.80]
and so, if f is a one-one mapping fromM ontoN , then in replacing each element,
m, of M with f(m)
M transforms into N without change of cardinal number. (p.88)
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In its weakest form, the principle Cantor cites says that if a single element of
M is replaced by an arbitrary element not in M then the cardinal number of
the set will remain the same. That is,
(1.4) (a ∈M ∧ b /∈M)
∧N = {x | (x ∈M ∧ x /∈ a) ∨ x ∈ b }
→ |M | = |N |
The reasoning is clear: so far as the cardinal number of a set is concerned, one
element is much the same as another. It is not the elements of a set, but only
their abstractions, that enter into the cardinal number of a set. But abstractions
of elements are just units; so one is much the same as another.
ONE-ONEb is true, Cantor says, because
. . . |M | grows, so to speak, out of M in such a way that from every
element m of M a special unit of |M | arises. Thus we can say that
M ∼ |M |.
So, since a set is similar to its cardinal number, and similarity is an equivalence
relation, two sets with same cardinal number are similar. Unless each element
of a set abstracts to a ‘special’, i.e. distinct, unit, the correspondence from M
to its cardinal number will be many-one and not one-one. A weak version of
this principle is:
M = {a, b} ∧ a 6= b
→ |M | = {Abstract(a),Abstract(b)}
∧ Abstract(a) 6= Abstract(b)
(1.5)
These two arguments do one another in. (1.4) says that replacing an element
of a set with any element not in the set does not affect the cardinality. But, by
the definition of |M |, (1.1), this means that
∀x∀y(Abstract(x) = Abstract(y))(1.6)
For, consider an arbitrary pair of elements, a and b. Let M = {a} and let
N = {b}. So, the conditions of (1.4) are met and |M | = |N |. But |M | =
{Abstract(a)} and |N | = {Abstract(b)}, by (1.1). So Abstract(a) = Abstract(b).
Generalizing this argument yields (1.6).
So Cantor’s argument for ONE-ONEa only works by assigning all non-
empty sets the same, one-membered, cardinal number. But, this contradicts
ONE-ONEb.
Conversely, the argument that a set is similar to its cardinal number relies
on (1.5), which entails
∀x∀y(x 6= y → Abstract(x) 6= Abstract(y))(1.7)
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assuming only that any two objects can constitute a set. But if the abstractions
of any two elements are distinct, then no two sets have the same cardinal number
as defined by (1.1), contra ONE-ONEa.
There is no way to repair Cantor’s argument. Rather than leading to a
justification of ONE-ONE, Cantor’s definition of cardinal number is sufficient
to refute the principle. The negation of (1.6) is:
∃x∃y(Abstract(x) 6= Abstract(y))(1.8)
So one of (1.6) and (1.8) must be true. We have shown that (1.6) contradicts
ONE-ONEb. Similarly, (1.8) contradicts ONE-ONEa; if a and b have distinct
abstractions, then {a} and {b} have distinct cardinal numbers, {Abstract(a)}
and {Abstract(b)}, despite the fact that they are in one-one correspondence. So
ONE-ONE is false whether (1.6) or its negation, (1.8), is true.
1.3 Cantor and the logicists
Though both Frege and Russell accepted Cantor’s theory of cardinality, neither
accepted Cantor’s argument. Frege spends an entire chapter of the Grundlagen
mocking mathematicians from Euclid to Schroder for defining numbers as sets
of units. He neatly summarizes the difficulty with such views:
If we try to produce the number by putting together different dis-
tinct objects, the result is an agglomeration in which the objects
remain still in possession of precisely those properties which serve to
distinguish them from one another, and that is not the number. But
if we try to do it in the other way, by putting together identicals,
the result runs perpetually together into one and we never reach a
plurality . . .
The word ‘unit’ is admirably adapted to conceal the difficulty . . . We
start by calling the things to be numbered ‘units’ without detracting
from their diversity; then subsequently the concept of putting to-
gether (or collecting, or uniting, or annexing, or whatever we choose
to call it) transforms itself into arithmetical addition, while the con-
cept word ‘unit’ changes unperceived into the proper name ‘one’.
[Frege, pp 50-51]
These misgivings about units do not prevent Frege from basing his definition
of ‘number’ and his entire reduction of arithmetic on Cantor’s notion of one-
one correspondence. “This opinion”, says Frege, “that numerical equality or
identiy must be defined in terms of one-one correlation, seems in recent years to
have gained widespread acceptance among mathematicians” [Frege, pp. 73-74].
Frege cites Schroder, Kossak, and Cantor.
Russell displays similar caution about Cantor’s argument [Russell, p.305] and
similar enthusiasm for his theory (see the quote at the beginning of Chapter 2,
for example.)
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Of course, Frege and Russell cleaned up Cantor’s presentation of the theory.
Russell, for example, notes that Cantor’s statement (1) is not a ‘true definition’
and
merely presupposes that every collection has some such property as
that indicated — a property, that is to say, independent of its terms
and their order; depending, we might feel tempted to add, only upon
their number. [Russell, pp. 304-305]
So Russell, and similarly Frege, relied upon the principle of abstraction to obtain
a ‘formal definition’ of cardinal numbers, in contrast to Cantor, who had “taken”
number “to be a primitive idea” and had to rely on “the primitive proposition
that every collection has a number.” [Russell, p.305]
So, while some people regard Cantor’s ONE-ONE as just a definition and
others embrace it as a theory, the logicists have it both ways: adding ONE-ONE
as a formal definition to set theory (or, as they would call it, logic) they have no
obligation to defend it and can steer clear of peculiar arguments about units ; at
the same time, they can advance it as a great lesson for simple common sense.
The logicists’ adoption of Cantor’s theory of cardinality needs no great ex-
planation: it came with set theory and, to a large extent, motivated set theory
and determined its research problems. But there are two specific reasons that
they should have seized upon ONE-ONE and CANTOR<. First, they both
have the form of definitions, no matter how they are intended. So the notion of
cardinality is born reduced.
Second, Cantor’s theory clears the way for other reductions. Suppose, for
example, you wish to reduce ordered pairs to sets. Well, you have to identify
each ordered pair with a set and define the relevant properties and relations
among ordered pairs in terms of properties and relations among sets. One
of the relations that has to be maintained is identity; so each ordered pair
must be identified with a distinct set. In addition, the relative sizes of sets of
ordered pairs should be preserved under translation. But, if ONE-ONE is the
correct theory of size, then this second condition follows from the first, since the
existence of one-one correspondences will be preserved under a one-one mapping.
1.4 Aims and outline
It would be naive to suppose that people’s faith in Cantor’s theory would be
shaken either by refuting specific arguments for ONE-ONE or by associating the
acceptance of that theory with a discredited philosophy of mathematics. Such
points may be interesting, but in the absence of an alternative theory of size
they are less than convincing.
This dissertation presents such an alternative. Chapter 2 canvasses common
sense intuitions for some basic principles about set size. Chapter 3 reorganizes
those principles into a tidy set of axioms, offers an account of where the intu-
itions come from (viz. known facts about finite sets), and mines this source for
additional principles. Chapters 4 and 5 prove that the theory so obtained is
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complete, in the sense that it embraces all facts about finite sets of a certain
kind (i.e. expressible in a particular language). Finally, Chapter 6 elaborates
additional principles that concern only sets of natural numbers and demon-
strates that these additional principles, together with the theory in Chapter 3,
are satisfiable in the domain of sets of natural numbers.
2The General Theory
The possibility that whole and part may have the same number
of terms is, it must be confessed, shocking to common sense . . .
Common sense, therefore, is here in a very sorry plight; it must
choose between the paradox of Zeno and the paradox of Cantor. I
do not propose to help it, since I consider that, in the face of the
proofs, it ought to commit suicide in despair. [Russell, p. 358]
Is common sense confused about set size, as Russell says, or is there a way
of elaborating on common sense to get a plausible and reasonably adequate
theory of cardinality? To be plausible, a theory should at least avoid principles
and consequences which violate common sense. To be reasonably adequate, a
theory has to go beyond bare intuitions: it should not rest with trivialities and
it should answer as many questions about set size as possible, though it need
not be complete. Plausibility and adequacy are conflicting demands: the first
says that there should not be too many principles (no false ones, consistency),
the second that there should not be too few principles.
In the Introduction, I argued that a coherent theory of cardinality has to
contain some principles that refer to the kinds of objects in sets, pace Cantor. In
this chapter, however, I want to see how far we can go without such principles;
i.e. how much can you say about smaller than without using predicates (other
than identity) which relate the members of the sets being compared? I shall
begin by stating a number of principles and explaining why they are included
in the general theory.
2.1 The Theory CORE
First, there is the SUBSET principle:
SUBSET. If x is a proper subset of y, then x is smaller than y.
The reason for including SUBSET should be obvious. What has prompted the
search for an alternative to the standard theory of cardinality is the conflict
9
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between ONE-ONE and SUBSET. Now, it is often said that common sense
supports both of these principles and that it is in doing so that common sense
is confused. From this it is supposed to follow that common sense cannot be
relied upon, so we should opt for ONE-ONE,with the technical attractions that
it provides.
But, there’s a difference in the way that common sense supports these two
principles. There is no doubt that you can lead an unsuspecting person to
agree to ONE-ONE by focusing their attention on forks and knives, husbands
and wives, and so forth: i.e. finite sets. With carefully chosen examples, say
the odds and the evens, you might even convince someone that ONE-ONE is
true for infinite sets, too. Now, I do not think that such guile is needed to
lead someone to agree to SUBSET, but that’s not what my argument depends
on. The argument hinges on a suggestion about how to resolve cases where
mathematical intuitions seem to conflict. The suggestion is to see what happens
with particular cases on which the principles conflict before you’ve lead someone
to agree to either of the general statements.
So, if you want to find out what common sense really thinks about SUBSET
and ONE-ONE, you would present people with pairs of infinite sets, where one
was a proper subset of the other. I’ve actually tried this, in an unscientific way,
and what I’ve gotten, by and large, is what I expected: support for SUBSET.
(By and large because many people think that all infinite sets have the same
size: Infinity.)
Naturally, I would not venture that this sort of technique, asking people, is
any way to find out which of SUBSET and ONE-ONE is true. People’s intu-
itions about mathematics are notoriously unreliable, not to mention inconstant.
Of course, harping on this fact might engender some unwarranted skepticism
about mathematics. What I am suggesting is that there might be a rational
way of studying mathematical intuitions and that we should at least explore
this possibility before proclaiming common sense to be hopelessly confused on
mathematical matters.
So, SUBSET, all by itself seems to be a plausible alternative to Cantor’s
theory. though it surely is not enough. Given just this principle, it’s possible
that one set is smaller than another just in case it is a proper subset of the
other. It’s clear that we need additional principles. All of the following seem
worthy (where x < y is to be read as x is smaller than y, x ∼ y is to be read as
x is the same size as y, x > y as x is larger than y. The Appendix gives a full
account of the notations used throughout this thesis.)
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Theory 2.1.1. QUASI-LOGICAL
x < y → ¬y < x(ASYM<)
x > y → ¬y > x(ASYM>)
(x < y ∧ y < z)→ x < z(TRANS<)
(x > y ∧ y > z)→ x > z(TRANS>)
x ∼ y → Indisc(x, y)(INDISC∼)
x ∼ x(REF∼)
x ∼ y → y ∼ x(SYM∼)
(x ∼ y ∧ y ∼ z)→ x ∼ z(TRANS∼)
x > y ↔ y < x(DEF>)
where Indisc(x, y) abbreviates ∀z((z < x↔ z < y) ∧ (z > x↔ z > y))
We call the principles listed above quasi-logical principles because it is
tempting to defend them as logical truths. Consider the first principle, for
example, in unregimented English:
ASYM<. If x is smaller than y, then y is not smaller than x.
This sentence can be regarded as an instance of the schema:
ASYMF . If x is F -er than y, then y is not F -er than x.
where F is to be replaced by an adjective from which comparatives can be
formed, e.g. ‘tall’, ‘short’, ‘happy’, but not ‘unique’ or ‘brick’. It appears that
every instance of this schema is true, so it could be maintained that each is true
in virtue of its form, that each is a logical truth.
The other principles might be defended in the same way, though the schema
for INDISC∼ would have to be restricted to triples of corresponding compara-
tives, for example: is smaller than, is larger than, is the same size as.
But using such observations to support these principles would be problematic
for two reasons. First, it would require taking positions on many questions
about logical form and grammatical form which would take us far afield and,
possibly, antagonize first-order logicians. Second, there are some instances of
the schemata that make for embarassing counterexamples: ‘further east than’
(in a round world) and ‘earlier than’ (in, I’m told, a possible world).
So, it might be that casting the principles above as instances of the appro-
priate schema would only explain why they are part of common sense. What
remains clear is that a theory of cardinality which openly denied any of these
principles would be implausible: it would be ridiculed by common sense and
mathematical sophisticates alike. I can just barely imagine presenting a theory
which, for fear of inconsistency, withheld judgment on one or more of these
principles. But to do so without good reason would be counterproductive. It
seems that if a case could be made that these statements, taken together, are
inconsistent with SUBSET, that would be good reason to say that there is no
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reasonably adequate alternative to Cantor’s theory. Since my goal is to counter
such a conclusion, it seems that the proper strategy is to include such seemingly
obvious truths and to show that the resulting theory is consistent. So the strat-
egy here is not to adduce principles and argue for the truth of each. This would
be impossible, given that the principles are logically contingent. Instead, our
approach is to canonize what common sense holds to be true about cardinality
and show that the result is consistent and reasonably adequate.
As long as we restrict ourselves to SUBSET and the quasi-logical principles,
consistency is no problem. After all, what do the quasi-logical principles say?
Only that smaller than is a partial ordering, the larger than is the converse
partial ordering, that the same size as is an equivalence relation, and that
sets of the same size are indiscernible under the partial orderings. So, if we
are given any domain of sets, finite or infinite, we get a model for our theory
by assigning to < the relation of being a proper subset of, assigning to > the
relation of properly including, and assigning to ∼ the identity relation. Since
common sense knows that different sets can be the same size, there must be
some additional principles to be extracted from common sense.
We shall now consider some principles which cannot be regarded as quasi-
logical.
First, there is the principle of trichotomy.
x < y ∨ x ∼ y ∨ x > y(TRICH)
which says that any two sets are comparable in size. While a theory of set size
which excluded TRICH might escape ridicule, it would surely be regarded with
suspicion. Indeed, if the principles of common sense were incompatible with
TRICH, this would undoubtedly be used to discredit them.
Second, there is the representation principle.
x < y → ∃x′(x′ ∼ x ∧ x′ ⊂ y)(REP<)
which says that if a set, x, is smaller than another, y, then x is the same size
as some proper subset of y. Now, this is a principle which common sense has
no particular feelings about. Analogous statements about physical objects are
neither intuitive nor very clearly true. For example, (1) does not stand a chance
of being regarded as true:
(1) If one table is smaller than another, then the first is the same
size as some proper part of the second.
if ‘part’ is taken to mean ‘leg or top or rim or ...’. Even if common sense can
be persuaded to take particles and arbitrary fusions of such as parts of tables,
no one should condemn its residual caution about (1). If REP< is true, then it
seems to be an interesting and special fact about sets.
REP< was originally included in this theory for technical reasons; it makes
it easier to reduce the set of axioms already presented and it provides a basis for
several principles not yet presented. REP< may be open to doubt, but it is not
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a principle that Cantorians could complain about, for it is entailed by Cantor’s
definition of <:
x < y ↔ ¬(x ∼ y) ∧ ∃x′(x′ ∼ x ∧ x′ ⊂ y)(CANTOR<)
If CANTOR< is regarded as a principle instead of a definition, then it is entailed
by the principles we have already mentioned:
If x < y, then ¬(x ∼ y), by INDISC∼ and ASYM<. By REP<,
some proper subset of y, say x′, must be the same size as x. But
x′ < y, by SUBSET: so x < y′, by INDISC∼.
Conversely, if x′ ∼ x and x′ ⊂ y, then x′ < y, by SUBSET. So
x < y, by INDISC∼.
There are more principles to come, but before proceeding, I’d like to take stock
of what we already have. First, I want to reduce the principles mentioned above
to a tidy set of axioms. Second, I want to estimate how far we’ve gone.
The entire set of principles already adopted are equivalent to the following,
which will be referred to as the core theory.
Theory 2.1.2. CORE, the core theory,
x ⊂ y → x < y(SUBSET)
x ∼ y ↔ Indisc(x, y)(DEF∼)
(x ∼ y ∧ y ∼ z)→ x ∼ z(TRANS∼)
x > y ↔ y < x(DEF>)
¬(x < x)(IRREF<)
x < y ∨ x ∼ y ∨ x > y(TRICH)
The only axiom in CORE that has not already been introduced is DEF∼,
which is logically equivalent to the conjunction of INDISC∼ and its converse
∼INDISC:
x ∼ y → Indisc(x, y)(INDISC∼)
Indisc(x, y)→ x ∼ y(∼INDISC)
∼INDISC says that if two sets fail to be the same size, then their being different
in size is attributable to the existence of some set which is either smaller than
one but not smaller than the other, or larger than one but not larger than the
other.
Theorem 2.1.3. Let T = QUASI; SUBSET;REP<. Then T ≡ CORE.
Proof.
⊢ T ⊢ CORE. We only need to show that ∼INDISC is entailed by T .
Suppose ¬(x ∼ y). So x < y or y < x, by TRICH. But ¬(x < x) and
¬(y < y), by IRREF<.
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⊣ CORE ⊢ T
(i) TRANS<. If y < z, there is a y′ such that y′ ∼ y and y′ ⊂ z by
REP<. If x < y, then x < y′ because y′ ∼ y, by DEF∼. So, there
is an x′ such that x′ ∼ x and x′ ⊂ y′. So x′ ⊂ z and, by SUBSET,
x′ < z. But then x < z by DEF∼.
(ii) ASYM<. If x < y and y < x, then x < x, by TRANS<, contra
IRREF<.
(iii) TRANS>, ASYM>, and IRREF> follow from the corresponding
principles for < and DEF>.
(iv) INDISC∼, SYM∼, TRANS∼, and REF∼ are logical consequences of
DEF∼.
CORE is consistent. In fact, two kinds of models satisfy CORE.
Definition 2.1.4.
a. A is a finite class model with basis x iff
(i) A˙ = P(x), where x is finite.
(ii) A  a ⊂ b iff a ⊂ b
(iii) A  a < b iff |a| < |b|
b. A is a finite set model iff
(i) A˙ = {x | x is a finite subset of Y }, for some infinite Y .
(ii) A  a ⊂ b iff a ⊂ b
(iii) A  a < b iff |a| < |b|
Models can be specified by stipulation the smaller than relation since larger
than and same size as are defined in terms of smaller than.
Fact 2.1.5.
a. If A is a finite class model, then A  CORE.
b. If A is a finite set model, then A  CORE.
Proof. In both cases, the finite cardinalities determine a quasi-linear ordering
of the sets in which any set is higher than any of its proper subsets.
The normal ordering of finite sets is, in fact, the only one that satisfies
CORE. By adding TRICH we have ruled out all non-standard interpretations
of <.
Theorem 2.1.6. Suppose that A is a model such that
2.1. THE THEORY CORE 15
a. If x ∈ A˙, then x is finite,
b. If x ∈ A˙ and y ⊂ x, then y ∈ A˙, and
c. A  CORE.
Then A  a < b iff |a| < |b|
Proof. We shall prove (*) by induction on n:
If |a| = n, then A  (a ∼ b) iff |b| = n(*)
Suppose n = 0
then a = ∅
But if |b| = 0
then A  (a ∼ b) by REF∼
And if |b| 6= 0
then a ⊂ b
So A  (a < b) by SUBSET
So A 2 (a ∼ b) by INDISC∼
Now, suppose that (*) is true for all i ≤ n:
If |a| = |b| = n+ 1
then A 2 (a ∼ b), as follows:
Suppose A  (a < b)
So A  (a′ ∼ a) for some a′ ⊂ b by REP<
But if A  a′ ⊂ b
then |a′| ≤ n
So |a| ≤ n by (*), contra our hypothesis.
But if |a| = n+ 1
and A  (a ∼ b)
then |b| ≥ n+ 1 by induction.
But if |b| > n+ 1
pick b′ ⊂ b, b′ ∈ A,
with |b′| = n+ 1 by condition (b)
So A  (b′ < b) by SUBSET
and A  (b′ ∼ a)
So A  (a < b) contra our supposition.
So |b| = n+ 1
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2.2 Addition of Set Sizes
We shall now extend CORE to an account of addition of set sizes. Since the
domains of our intended models contain only sets and not sizes of sets, we have
to formulate our principles in terms of a three-place predicate true of triples of
sets: Sum (x, y, z) is to be read as the size of z is the sum of the sizes of x and
y .
The following principles are sufficient for a theory of addition:
Theory 2.2.1. Addition
Functionality of addition
Sum(x, y, z)→ (x ∼ x′ ↔ Sum(x′, y, z)(a)
Sum(x, y, z)→ (y ∼ y′ ↔ Sum(x, y′, z)(b)
Sum(x, y, z)→ (z ∼ z′ ↔ Sum(x, y, z′)(c)
Addition for disjoint sets
x ∩ y = ∅ → Sum(x, y, x ∪ y)(DISJ+)
Monotonicity of Addition
Sum(x, y, z)→ x < z ∨ x ∼ z(MONOT)
FUNC+ says that sets bear Sum relations to one another by virtue of their
sizes alone. This condition must clearly be met if Sum is to be read as specified
above.
DISJ+ tries to say what function on sizes the Sum relation captures by fixing
the function on paradigm cases: disjoint sets. But FUNC+ and DISJ+ leave
open the possibility that addition is cyclic: suppose we begin with a finite class
model whose basis has n elements and assign to Sum those triples 〈x, y, z〉 where
|z| = (|x|+ |y|) mod (n+ 1)
Both FUNC+ and DISJ+ will be satisfied, though the interpretation of Sum does
not agree with the intended reading. MONOT rules out such interpretations.
Given an interpretation of ’¡’ over a power set there is at most one way of
interpreting Sum which satisfies ADDITION. We shall show this by proving
that ADDITION and CORE entail DEF+:
(DEF+) Sum(x, y, z)↔
∃x′∃y′(x ∼ x′ ∧ y ∼ y′ ∧ x′ ∩ y′ = ∅ ∧ x′ ∪ y′ = z)
DEF+ says that the extension of Sum is determined by the extension of ¡.
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A model of CORE must satisfy an additional principle, DISJ∪, if Sum is to
be interpreted in a way compatible with ADDITION,
(DISJ∪) (x ∼ x′ ∧ y ∼ y′ ∧ x ∩ y = ∅ ∧ x′ ∩ y′ = ∅)
→ (x ∪ y) ∼ (x′ ∪ y′)
(Note: The proofs in this chapter will use boolean principles freely, despite the
fact that we have not yet introduced them.)
Theorem 2.2.2. CORE + ADDITION ⊢ DISJ∪
Proof.
Suppose (x ∼ x′ ∧ y ∼ y′ ∧ x ∩ y = ∅ ∧ x′ ∩ y′ = ∅)
then Sum(x, y, x ∪ y)
and Sum(x′, y′, x′ ∪ y′) by DISJ+
So Sum(x′, y, x ∪ y) by FUNC+ (a)
So Sum(x′, y′, x ∪ y) by FUNC+ (b)
So x ∪ y ∼ x′ ∪ y′ by FUNC+ (c)
If the minimal conditions on addition are to be satisfied in a model of CORE,
then Sum has to be definable by DEF+.
Theorem 2.2.3. CORE + ADDITION ⊢ DEF+
Proof. (⇒)
Suppose Sum(x, y, z)
So x < z ∨ x ∼ z by MONOT
But if x ∼ z,
Let x′ = z
and y′ = ∅;
then Sum(x′, y′, z) by DISJ+
So Sum(x, y′, z) by FUNC+ (a)
So y′ ∼ y by FUNC+ (b)
And if x < z
pick x′ ⊂ z
with x′ ∼ x by REP<.
Let y′ = z − x′
But y′ ∼ y, as before.
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(⇐)
Suppose (x ∼ x′ ∧ y ∼ y′ ∧ x′ ∩ y′ = ∅ ∧ x′ ∪ y′ = z)
then Sum(x′, y′, z) by DISJ+
So Sum(x, y′, z) by FUNC+ (a)
So Sum(x, y, z) by FUNC+ (b)
Theory 2.2.4. EXCORE, the extended core, is CORE ∪ ADDITION.
Fact 2.2.5. The following are consequences of EXCORE:
x ∩ y1 = x ∩ y2 = ∅ ∧ y1 ∼ y2 → x ∪ y1 ∼ x ∪ y2
x ∩ y1 = x ∩ y2 = ∅ ∧ y1 < y2 → x ∪ y1 < x ∪ y2
x1 ∩ y1 = x1 ∩ y2 = ∅ ∧ x1 ∼ x2 ∧ y1 < y2 → x1 ∪ y1 < x2 ∪ y2
x ⊂ z ∧ y ⊂ z ∧ x < y → (z − y) < (z − x)
x ⊂ z ∧ y ⊂ z ∧ x ∼ y → (z − y) ∼ (z − x)
x < y → ∃y′(y′ ∼ y ∧ x ⊂ y′)
x ∼ y → x− (x ∩ y) ∼ y − (x ∩ y)
x < y → x− (x ∩ y) < y − (x ∩ y)
Proof. The proofs are elementary.
3A Formal Theory of Class
Size
In the preceding chapter, we searched for principles that accord with pre-
Cantorian ideas about sizes of sets. We produced several such principles, consti-
tuting EXCORE, and found two kinds of interpretations which satisfied these
principles. In one case, the domains of the interpretations were finite power
sets. In the other case, the domains consisted of all finite subsets of a given
infinite set. Insofar as both kinds of interpretation have quantifiers ranging over
finite sets, we may say that they demonstrate that EXCORE is true when it is
construed as being about finite sets.
Our goal is to show that this general theory of set size can be maintained for
infinite sets as well as for finite sets. We shall show this by constructing a model
for the general theory whose domain is the power set of the natural numbers.
But the ability to construct such a model is interesting only to the extent that
the general theory it satisfies is reasonably adequate. Suppose, for example, that
we offered as a general theory of size the axioms of CORE other than REP<.
Call this theory T. So T just says that smaller than is a quasi-linear ordering
which extends the partial ordering given by the proper subset relation. Since
any partial ordering can be extended to a quasi-linear ordering, T has a model
over P(N). But unless we have a guarantee that the model constructed will
satisfy, say, DISJ∪, the existence of the model does not rule out the possibility
that T is incompatible with DISJ∪. For a particular principle, φ, in this case
DISJ∪, we may take one of three tacks: (1) add φ to T, obtaining T ′, and show
that T ′ has a model over P(N); (2) show that φ is inconsistent with T and argue
that T is somehow more fundamental or more intuitive than φ; (3) acquiesce
in ignorance of whether T and φ are compatible and argue that if they are
incompatible, then T should be maintained anyway.
Below, we deal with DISJ∪ as in (1), since DISJ∪ is in EXCORE. Cantor’s
principle ONE-ONE is dealt with as in case (2). It seems futile to try to rule
out the need to resort to the third approach for any cases at all, but we can
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reduce this need to the extent that we include in our general theory, T, as many
plausible statements as possible.
We cannot construct T by taking all statements which are true for finite
sets. Not only is ONE-ONE such a statement, but using the notion of all
statements true for finite sets presupposes that we have some idea of the range
of all statements. To avoid the problems involved in speaking of all statements,
we might instead settle for all statements in L, where L is some judiciously
chosen language. To avoid ONE-ONE, T must fall short of the full expressive
power of the language of set theory.
Consider, now, the axioms in EXCORE. Other than size relations, these
axioms involve only boolean operations and inclusion relations among sets. They
do not use the notions ordered pair, relation, or function. In short, the only set
theory implicit in these axioms is boolean algebra, or a sort of Venn diagram
set theory. This is not to say the axioms do not apply to relations, functions,
or other sets of ordered pairs, but only that they do not refer to these sorts of
objects as such.
In the next section, we define a language just strong enough to express
EXCORE. We then construct a theory by taking all statements in that language
which are true over all finite power sets. By drawing statements only from this
relatively weak language, we arrive at a theory which can be satisfied over
infinite power sets. But, since we include in the language all statements of the
language which are true over any finite power set, we know that no statement in
that language can arise as something which ought to be true over infinite power
sets but might be incompatible with our theory.
There remains the possibility that we could follow the same strategy with a
more expressive language, though it would have to remain less expressive that
the full language of set theory. In fact, such a language can be obtained by
including a notion of the product of set sizes. This in turn opens the possibility
of a succession of richer languages and a corresponding succession of stronger
theories of size. At this point, the possible existence of any such hierarchy is
sheer speculation; we mention it only to emphasize that no claim is made here
that we have the strongest possible general theory of set size.
3.1 CS - The Theory of Class Size
The theories discussed in this paper will be formulated within first order predi-
cate logic with identity. To specify the language in which a theory is expressed,
then, we need only list the individual constants, predicates, and operation sym-
bols of the language and stipulate the rank, or number of argument places, for
each predicate and each operation symbol.
Definition 3.1.1.
a. LC , LC, the language of classes, is the first order language with in-
dividual constants ∅ and I, the one-place predicate, Atom, the two-place
predicate ⊂, and the two place operation symbols, −, ∩, and ∪.
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b. L<, the language of size,, is the first order language with the one-
place predicate Unit, the two-place predicates < and ⊂, and the three place
predicate Sum.
c. LC<, the language of class size, is the first order language containing
just the non-logical constants in LC and L<.
Following the strategy outlined above, we define the theory of class size in
terms of interpretations of LC< over finite power sets.
Definition 3.1.2.
a. If LC ⊂ L, then A is a standard interpretation of L iff
(i) A˙ = P(x), for some x, and
(ii) A assigns the usual interpretations to all constants of LC:
A(I) = x,
A(∅) = ∅,
A  a ⊂ b iff a ⊂ b
b. If A is a standard interpretation and A˙ = P(x), then x is the basis of A,
B(A).
Definition 3.1.3. A is a standard finite interpretation of LC< iff
a. A is a standard interpretation of LC<,
b. A has a finite basis, and
c.
A  a < b iff |a| < |b|,
A  a ∼ b iff |a| = |b|, and
A  Unit(a) iff |a| = 1
Definition 3.1.4. CS, the theory of class size, is the set of all sentences
of LC< which are true in all standard finite interpretations of LC<.
By drawing only on principles which can be stated in LC< we have at least
ruled out the most obvious danger of paradox. Since the notion of one-to-
one correspondence cannot be expressed in this language, Cantor’s principle
ONE-ONE will not be included in the theory CS, even though it is true over
any finite power set.
Since CS has arbitarily large finite models, it has infinite models. It is not
obvious that CS has standard infinite models, in which the universe is an infinite
power set. In Chapter 6 we show that such models do exist.
The present chapter is devoted to getting a clearer picture of the theory CS.
Section 2 develops a set of axioms, CA, for CS. Section 3 outlines the proof
that CA does indeed axiomatize CS. This proof is presented in Chaper 5, after
a slight detour in Chapter 4.
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3.2 CA - Axioms for CS
Here we shall develop a set of axioms, CA, for the theory CS. This will be done
in several stages.
3.2.1 BA- Axioms for atomic boolean algebra
We’ll begin with the obvious. Since all of the universes of the interpretations
mentioned in the definition of CS are power sets, they must be atomic boolean
algebras and, so, must satisfy BA:
Definition 3.2.1. BA, the theory of atomic boolean algebras, is the the-
ory consisting of the following axioms:
x ∪ y = y ∪ x
x ∩ y = y ∩ x
x ∪ (y ∪ z) = (x ∪ y) ∪ z)
x ∩ (y ∩ z) = (x ∩ y) ∩ z)
x ∩ (y ∪ z) = (x ∩ y) ∪ (y ∩ z)
x ∪ (y ∩ z) = (x ∪ y) ∩ (y ∪ z)
x ∩ (I− x) = ∅
x ∪ (I− x) = I
x ⊂ y ↔ (x ∪ y) = y ∧ x 6= y
Atom(x)↔ (∀y)(y ⊂ x→ y = ∅)
x 6= ∅ → (∃y)(Atom(y) ∧ (y ⊂ x ∨ y = x)
These axioms are adapted from [Monk, Def 9.3, p. 141 and Def. 9.28, p.
151].
BA is clearly not a complete axiomatization of CS, since BA does not in-
volve any size notions. But BA does entail all the sentences in CS which do
not themselves involve size notions. To show this we need to draw on some
established facts about the complete extensions of BA (in the language LC).
The key idea here is that complete extensions of BA can be obtained either by
stipulating the finite number of atoms in a model or by saying that there are
infinitely many atoms.
Definition 3.2.2. For n ≥ 1,
a. ATLEASTn is a sentence which says that there are at least n atoms:
∃x1...∃xn(Atom(x1) ∧ ... ∧ Atom(xn) ∧ { xi 6= xj | 0 < i < j ≤ n })
b. EXACTLYn is a sentence which says that there are exactly n atoms:
ATLEASTn ∧ ¬ATLEASTn+1
3.2. CA - AXIOMS FOR CS 23
c. INF is a set of sentences which is satisfied in all and only infinite models
of BA:
INF = {ATLEASTn | n > 1 }
d. BAn = BA;EXACTLYn
e. BAI = BA ∪ INF
Fact 3.2.3.
a. For n ≥ 1, BAn is categorical. [Monk, Cor 9.32, p.152]
b. For n ≥ 1, BAn is complete. (Immediate from above)
c. For n ≥ 1, an n-atom atomic boolean algebra is isomorphic to any standard
finite interpretation of LC with an n-element basis. [Monk, Prop. 9.30,
p.151]
d. BA is complete. [Monk, Theorem 21.24, p.360]
e. BAI and the theories BAn, n ≥ 1, are the only complete, consistent ex-
tensions of BA.
Fact 3.2.4. If BAI ⊢ φ, then φ is true in some finite model of BA.
Proof. BA ∪ INF ⊢ φ. By compactness, then, there is a k such that
BA ∪ {ATLEASTn | 1 ≤ n ≤ k } ⊢ φ
So φ is true in any atomic boolean algebra with more than k atoms.
Theorem 3.2.5. If CS ⊢ φ, and φ ∈ LC , then BA ⊢ φ.
Proof. If BA 0 φ, then ¬φ is true is some atomic boolean algebra, A.
If A is finite, then A is isomorphic to some standard finite interpration A′
of LC . But, then ¬φ is true in A′, so φ is not true in A′ and φ /∈ CS.
If A is infinite, then ¬φ is consistent with BAI. But BAI is complete, so
BAI ⊢ ¬φ. By 3.2.4, ¬φ is true in some finite model A of BA. Hence, ¬φ is
true in some standard finite interpretation of LC and, again, φ /∈ CS.
3.2.2 Size principles
Here, we just gather the principles presented above as EXCORE:
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Theory 3.2.6. CORE SIZE consists of the following axioms:
x ⊂ y → x < y(SUBSET)
x > y ↔ y < x(DEF>)
x ∼ y ↔ Indisc(x, y)(DEF∼)
¬(x < x)(IRREF<)
x < y ∨ x ∼ y ∨ x > y(TRICH)
Unit(x)↔ Atom(x)(DEF1)
Sum(x, y, z)↔ ∃x′∃y′((DEF+)
x ∼ x′ ∧ y ∼ y′
∧ x′ ∩ y′ = ∅
∧ x′ ∪ y′ = z)
(x ∼ x′ ∧ y ∼ y′(DISJ∪)
∧x′ ∩ y′ = ∅
∧x′ ∪ y′ = z)→ x ∪ y ∼ x′ ∪ y′
Combining the principles of boolean algebra and the size principles, we ob-
tain our first serious attempt at a general theory of size:
Definition 3.2.7. BASIC, the basic theory, is defined as:
BA ∪ SIZE
3.2.3 Division principles
BASIC is not a complete axiomatization of CS. In this section we shall exhibit
an infinite number of principles which need to be added to BASIC in order to
axiomatize CS. When we are done, we will have an effective set of sentences,
CA, the Class Size Axioms, though we will not prove that CA ≡ CS until
Chapter 5.
To show that the new principles really do need to be added, we’ll need some
non-standard models of BASIC. These models will be similar in that (1)their
universes will be subsets of P(N), (2) their atoms will be singletons in P(N),
and (3) all boolean symbols will receive their usual interpretations. The models
will, however, include different subsets of N and assign different size orderings
to these sets.
In Chapter 6, these models of BASIC will reappear as submodels of various
standard models of CS over P(N). So, in addition to the immediate purpose of
establishing independence results, these models provide a glimpse of how sets
of natural numbers are ordered by size.
Every standard finite interpretation, A, of LC< satisfies exactly one of the
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following:
∃x∃y(x ∼ y ∧ x ∩ y = ∅ ∧ x ∪ y = I)(EVEN)
∃x∃y∃y(x ∼ y ∧ x ∩ y = x ∩ z = y ∩ z = ∅
∧Atom(z) ∧ x ∪ y ∪ z = I)
(ODD)
A  EVEN if |B(A)| is even and A  ODD if |B(A)| is odd. But BASIC 0
(EVEN ∨ODD). Consider the model F whose universe consists of all only the
finite and cofinite subsets of N, where, for a, b ∈ F˙ :
F  (a < b) iff a and b are both finite and |a| < |b|
or a and b are both cofinite and |N− a| > |N− b|
or a is finite and b is infinite.
F is a model of BASIC. But neither EVEN nor ODD is true in F , for any
two sets that are the same size are either both finite, in which case their union
is also finite, or both cofinite, in which case they cannot be disjoint.
So EVEN∨ODD is in CS, but not entailed by BASIC. As you might suspect,
this is just the tip of the iceberg of principles missing from an axiomatization of
CS. Informally, we can extend F to a model that satisfies EVEN by including
the set of even numbers and the set of odd numbers and making them the same
size. To round out the result to a model of BASIC, we also need to include all
sets which are near the set of evens or the set of odds, i.e. those that differ
from the evens or odds by a finite set. With these additions made, the new
model will be closed under boolean operations and will satisfy BA. There is
a (unique) way of ordering these added sets by smaller than that will satisfy
BASIC: rank them according to the size and direction of their finite difference
from the odds or the evens. So, we can construct an infinite model of BASIC ;
(EVEN ∨ ODD).
But this model will still not satisfy CS, as we can see by generalizing the
argument above. (EVEN∨ODD) says that the universe is roughly divisible by
two: EVEN says that the universe is divisible by two without remainder. ODD
says that there is a remainder of a single atom. We can construct a similar
statement that says the universe is roughly divisible by three — with remainder
0, 1, or 2. As with (EVEN ∨ ODD), this statement is in CS but is satisfied by
neither our original model nor the model as amended. Again, we can extend
the model and again we can produce a statement of CS which is false in the
resulting model.
We now formalize this line of reasoning.
Definition 3.2.8. If 0 ≤ m < n, then
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a. MODn,m is the sentence
∃x1...∃xn∃y1 . . . ∃ym(
x1 ∼ x2 ∼ . . . ∼ xn
∧ Atom(y1) ∧ . . . ∧ Atom(ym)
∧
∧
1≤i<j≤n
(xi ∩ xj = ∅)
∧
∧
1≤i<j≤m
(yi ∩ yj = ∅)
∧ (x1 ∪ . . . xn) ∩ (y1 ∪ . . . ym) = ∅
∧ (x1 ∪ . . . xn) ∪ (y1 ∪ . . . ym) = I)
MODn,m says that the universe is divisible into n sets of the same size
with m atoms remaining.
b. DIVn is the sentence
MODn,0 ∨ . . . ∨MODn,n−1
Fact 3.2.9. If 0 ≤ m < n and A is a standard finite interpretation of LC<,
then
A  MODn,m iff |B(A)| ≡ m mod n(a)
A  DIVn(b)
CS ⊢ DIVn(c)
Theorem 3.2.10. BASIC 0 CS
Proof. If n > 1, BASIC 0 DIVn. The model, F defined above satisfies BASIC
but not DIVn, for any n finite sets have a finite union and any two cofinite sets
overlap. So, BASIC 0 CS, by 3.2.9c.
We could consider adding all DIVn sentences to BASIC in the hope that this
would yield a complete set of axioms for CS. We did consider this, but it does
not work. To demonstrate this, we need some independence results for sets of
DIVn sentences.
Definition 3.2.11. If J is a set of natural numbers, then
a. DIVJ = {DIVn | n ∈ J }
b. BDIVJ = BASIC ∪DIVJ
c. BDIVj = BDIV{j}
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Our independence results will be obtained by constructing models of BASIC
which satisfy specific sets of DIV sentences. To build such models from subsets
of N, we shall include sets which can be regarded as fractional portions of N.
Definition 3.2.12. For n ≥ 0,
a. x is an n-congruence class iff x = [nk+m] for some m, where 0 ≤
m < n.
b. x is an n-quasi-congruence class iff x is the union of finitely many
n-congruence classes.
c. x is a congruence class iff x is an n-congruence class for some n.
d. x is a quasi-congruence class iff x is an n-quasi-congruence class for
some n.
e. QCn = { x | x is an n-quasi-congruence class }
f. QC =
⋃
n>0QCn
Examples.
a. The set of evens, [2n], and the set of odds, [2n+ 1], are 2-congruence
classes.
b. [3k+ 2] is a 3-congruence class.
c. N is a 1-congruence class.
d. N is an n-quasi-congruence class for every n > 0:
N = [nk+ 0] ∪ . . . ∪ [nk+ n− 1]
Fact 3.2.13.
a. If x ∈ QCn and y ∈ QCn, then x ∪ y ∈ QCn.
b. If x ∈ QCn, then N− x ∈ QCn.
Proof.
a. Suppose x = a1 ∪ . . . ak and y = b1 ∪ . . . bj . Then x∪ y = a1 ∪ . . . ak ∪ b1 ∪
. . . bj.
b. N itself is the union of n-congruence classes. If x is the union of m of these
classes, then N − x is the union of the remaining (n − m) n-congruence
classes.
Definition 3.2.14. x is near y, NEAR(x,y), iff x−y and y−x are both finite.
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Fact 3.2.15. x is near y iff there are finite sets, w1 and w2 such that x =
(y ∪ w1)− w2.
Proof.
⇒ Let w1 = x− y and let w2 = y − x.
⇐ Suppose x = (y ∪ w1) − w2. Then x − y ⊆ w1 and y − x ⊆ w2, so x − y
and y − x are finite.
Fact 3.2.16. If x1 ⊆ x ⊆ x2, x1 is near y, and x2 is near y, then x is near y.
Proof. Since x ⊆ x2, (x − y) ⊆ (x2 − y). But (x2 − y) is finite, so (x − y) is
finite.
Since x1 ⊆ x, (y−x) ⊆ (y−x1). But (y−x1) is finite, so (y−x) is finite.
Fact 3.2.17. NEAR is an equivalence relation.
Proof.
a. x is near x, since x− x = ∅, which is finite.
b. If x is near y, then y is near x. Immediate.
c. Suppose x is near y and y is near z. Note that
(z − x) = ((z ∩ y)− x) ∪ ((z − y)− x)
But (z − y)− x is finite because (z − y) is finite and ((z ∩ y)− x) is finite
because ((z ∩ y)− x) ⊆ (y − x), which is finite. So the union, (z − x), is
finite.
Similarly,
(x− z) = ((x ∩ y)− z) ∪ ((x− y)− z)
where ((x∩ y)− z) ⊆ (y− z) and ((x− y)− z ⊆ (x− y). So (x− z) is also
finite.
Hence, x is near z.
Fact 3.2.18.
a. If x1 is near x2, then x1 ∪ y is near x2 ∪ y.
b. If x1 is near x2 and y1 is near y2, then x1 ∪ y1 is near x2 ∪ y2.
c. If x is near y, then N− x is near N− y
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Proof.
a. Since x1 is near x2, x1 − x2 and x2 − x1 are finite. But
(x1 ∪ y)− (x2 ∪ y) ⊆ (x1 − x2)
and (x2 ∪ y)− (x1 ∪ y) ⊆ (x2 − x1)
b. By (a), x1 ∪ y1 is near x2 ∪ y1 , which is near x2 ∪ y2. So x1 ∪ y1 is near
x2 ∪ y2, by transitivity.
c. (N − x) − (N − y) = y − x and (N − y) − (N− x) = x − y. So if x and y
are near each other, so are their complements.
We can now define the domains of the models we will use to establish the
independence results.
Definition 3.2.19.
a. Qn = { y | y is near an n-quasi-congruence class }
b. Q =
⋃
n>0Qn
Examples.
a. Q1 = { y ⊆ N | y is finite or cofinite }.
b. Q2 = { y ⊆ N | y is finite, cofinite, near [2n] or near [2n+ 1] }.
Q2 is the domain of the model constructed above to satisfy DIV2.
Fact 3.2.20. If A is a class of sets such that
a.
⋃
A ∈ A,
b. If x ∈ A, then
⋃
A− x ∈ A, and
c. If x ∈ A and y ∈ A, then x ∪ y ∈ A,
then A forms a boolean algebra under the usual set-theoretic operations, where
I is interpreted as A. [Monk, Def. 9.1, p.141 and Corr 9.4, p.142]
Theorem 3.2.21. If n > 0, then Qn forms an atomic boolean algebra under
the usual set-theoretic operations.
Proof. Using Fact 3.2.20:
a.
⋃
{Qn} = N, since N ∈ {Qn} and if x ∈ Qn, then x ⊆ N.
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b. If x ∈ Qn, then
Suppose x is near y
and y ∈ QCn
So N− y ∈ QCn by 3.2.13b
and N− x is near N− y by 3.2.18b
So N− x ∈ Qn.
c.
Suppose x ∈ Qn
and y ∈ Qn
then x is near x′
and x′ ∈ QCn for some x′
and y is near y′
and y′ ∈ QCn for some y′
But then x′ ∪ y′ ∈ QCn by 3.2.13a
and x ∪ y is near x′ ∪ y′ by 3.2.18b
So x ∪ y ∈ QCn
Thus, Qn is a boolean algebra. Moreover, every singleton is in Qn since all
singletons are near ∅. So Qn is an atomic boolean algebra.
We now define a size function on all sets which are near quasi-congruence
classes. The sizes assigned to sets are ordered pairs. The first member is a
rational between 0 and 1 which represents the density of the set. The second
member is an integer which represents the finite (possibly negative) deviation
of a set from average sets of the same density. First, we define the ordering and
arithmetic for these sizes with the intention of inducing the size ordering and
Sum relation for sets from the assignment of sizes to sets.
Definition 3.2.22.
a. A size is an ordered pair 〈ρ, δ〉, where ρ is rational and δ is an integer.
b. If θ1 = 〈ρ1, δ1〉 and θ2 = 〈ρ2, δ2〉 are sizes, then
(i) θ1 < θ2 iff ρ1 < ρ2 or (ρ1 = ρ2 ∧ δ1 < δ2).
(ii) θ1 + θ2 = 〈ρ1 + ρ2, δ1 + δ2〉
Only some of these sizes will actually be assigned to sets. Specifically, a size
will be assigned to a set only if 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Moreover, if ρ = 0, then δ ≥ 0 and
if ρ = 1, then δ ≤ 0.
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Our intention in assigning sizes to sets is as follows: Suppose x is near an
n-quasi-congruence class, x′. So x′ is the union of k ≤ n n-quasi-congruence
classes. The set x′ has density k/n and this is the value, ρ, assigned to x. The
δ value assigned to x is the finite number of elements added to or removed from
x′ to obtain x.
The definitions and facts below formalize this intention and demonstrate
that the assignment of sizes to sets is well-defined.
Fact 3.2.23.
a. If x ∈ QC, y ∈ QC, and x 6= y, then x is not near y. (That is, no two
quasi-congruence classes are near each other.)
b. Any set is near at most one quasi-congruence class.
Proof.
a. Let n be the least number such that
x ∈ QCn and y ∈ QCn
So each is a disjoint union of n-congruence classes:
x = x1 ∪ . . . ∪ xj
and y = y1 ∪ . . . ∪ yk
Suppose a ∈ x− y
then a ∈ xi for some i.
But a /∈ yj , for any y.
So xi 6= yj , for any j
So xi ⊆ x− y
So x− y is infinite, since xi is infinite
Similarly, if a ∈ y − x, then y − x is infinite.
b. If x were near two quasi-congruence classes, the two would have to be near
each other, since NEAR is transitive. But this is impossible by (a).
Definition 3.2.24. If x is near a quasi-congruence class, then
a. C(x) is the quasi-congruence class near x.
b. ∆1(x) = x− C(x).
c. ∆2(x) = C(x) − x.
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∆1(x) and ∆2(x) are finite and
x = (C(x) ∪∆1(x)) −∆2(x)
Definition 3.2.25. If x ∈ QC, then
a. α(x) = the least n such that x ∈ QCn.
b. β(x) = the unique k such that x is the disjoint union of k α(x)-congruence
classes.
Examples.
a. If x = [2n+ 1], α(x) = 2 and β(x) = 1.
b. If x = [4n+ 1] ∪ [4n+ 2], α(x) = 4 and β(x) = 2.
c. If x = [4n+ 1] ∪ [4n+ 3], α(x) = 2 and β(x) = 1, since x = [2n+ 1].
Definition 3.2.26. If x ∈ Q, then
ρ(x) =
β(C(x))
α(C(x))
δ(x) = |∆1(x)| − |∆2(x)|
θ(x) = 〈ρ(x), δ(x)〉
We can, at last, define the models to be used in our independence proof.
Definition 3.2.27. For n > 0, Qn is the interpretation Q of LC< in which
boolean symbols receive their usual interpretation and
Q˙ = Qn
Q  x < y iff θ(x) < θ(y)
Q  x ∼ y iff θ(x) = θ(y)
Q  Unit(x) iff θ(x) = 〈0, 1〉
Q  Sum(x, y, z) iff θ(z) = θ(x) + θ(y)
To show that the models Qn satisfy BASIC, we will need the following facts
about congruence classes.
Fact 3.2.28.
a. If x = [an+ b] and a2 = ac, then
x =
⋃
0≤i<c
[a2n+ (ia+ b)]
b. If x ∈ QCn and m = kn, then x ∈ QCm.
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c. If x ∈ QC and y ∈ QC, there is an n such that x ∈ QCn and y ∈ QCn.
Proof.
a. If k ∈ [a2n+ (ia+ b)] for some i, 0 ≤ i < c, then, for some n1,
k = a2n1 + ia+ b
= a(cn1) + ia+ b
= a(cn1 + i) + b
So k ∈ x.
If k ∈ x, there is an n1 such that k = an1 + b. Let n2 be the greatest n
such that a2n ≤ k and let k′ = k − a2n2.
Since k ≡ b mod a
and a2n2 ≡ 0 mod a
then k′ ≡ b mod a
So k′ = ia+ b, where 0 ≤ i < c
But k = a2n2 + k
′ = a2n2 + ia+ b
So k ∈ [a2n+ (ia+ b)]
b. By (a), each n-congruence class is a disjoint union ofm-congruence classes.
c. Suppose x ∈ QCn1 and y ∈ QCn2 . Then, by (b), both x and y are in
QCn1n2 .
Theorem 3.2.29. For any n > 0, Qn  BASIC
Proof. By 3.2.21, Qn is an atomic boolean algebra; so Qn  BA. The <-relation
of Qn is induced from the linear ordering of sizes; so it is a quasi-linear ordering
and IRREF<, TRICH, and DEF∼ are satisfied. As for the remaining axioms:
a. SUBSET: Suppose x ⊂ y. If C(x) = C(y) then ρ(x) = ρ(y) and ∆1(x) ⊆
∆1(y) and ∆2(x) ⊆ ∆2(y), where at least one of these inclusions is proper.
So δ(x) < δ(y).
But if C(x) 6= C(y), then C(x) ⊂ C(y), so ρ(x) < ρ(y).
In either case, θ(x) < θ(y), so Qn  x < y.
b. REP<: Suppose Qn  x < y. So θ(x) = 〈k1/n, δ1〉, θ(x) = 〈k2/n, δ2〉, and
either k1 < k2 or δ1 < δ2.
We want to find some x′ ⊂ y such that Qn  x ∼ x′.
If k1 = k2 > 0, then y must be infinite; so, x
′ can be obtained by removing
δ2 − δ1 atoms from y.
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If k1 = k2 = 0, then 0 ≤ δ1 < δ2; so, again, x′ can be obtained by removing
δ2 − δ1 atoms from y.
If k2 > k1 > 0, then let y1 be the union of k1 n-congruence classes
contained in C(y). So y − y1 is infinite and y1 − y is finite. Let y2 =
y1− (y1−y) = y1∩y. So θ(y2) = 〈k1/n,−δ3〉 where δ3 = |y1−y|. Finally,
let δ4 = δ3 + δ1 and x
′ = y2 ∪ y3, where y3 ⊆ y1 − y with |y3| = δ4.
If k1 = 0, then x is finite. If k2 > 0, then y is infinite, so there is no
problem. If k2 = 0, then y is finite, but has more members than x, since
δ1 < δ2. So, let x
′ be any proper subset of y with δ1 members.
c. DISJ∪: It is enough to show that if x and y are disjoint, then θ(x ∪ y) =
θ(x) + θ(y). We need the following three facts:
(i) C(x ∪ y) = C(x) ∪ C(y). (See Fact 3.2.18b.)
(ii) ∆1(x ∪ y) = (∆1(x) ∪∆1(y))− (C(x) ∪C(y)).
If z ∈ x ∪ y but a /∈ C(x ∪ y), then a ∈ ∆1(x) or a ∈ ∆1(y); any
element of ∆1(x) is also in ∆1(x∪y) unless it is in C(y); any element
of ∆1(y) is also in ∆1(x ∪ y) unless it is in C(x).
(iii) ∆2(x ∪ y) = (∆2(x) ∪∆2(y))− (∆1(x) ∪∆1(y)).
Note that if x ∈ Q, y ∈ Q, and x ∩ y = ∅, then C(x) ∩ C(y) = ∅;
otherwise, C(x) and C(y) have an infinite intersection.
Hence, if a ∈ C(x) ∪ C(y)− (x ∪ y)
then a ∈ C(x) − x = ∆2(x)
or a ∈ C(y)− y = ∆2(y)
And if a ∈ ∆2(x), then a ∈ ∆2(x ∪ y)
unless a ∈ ∆1(y)
And if a ∈ ∆2(y), then a ∈ ∆2(x ∪ y)
unless a ∈ ∆1(x)
.
From (ii) we obtain (iia):
(iia) |∆1(x ∪ y)| = |∆1(x) ∪∆1(y)|
− |(∆1(x) ∪∆1(y) ∩ (C(x) ∪ C(y))|
and from (iii) we obtain (iiia):
(iiia) |∆2(x ∪ y)| = |∆2(x) ∪∆2(y)|
− |∆1(x) ∪∆1(y) ∩ (∆2(x) ∪∆2(y))|
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But ∆1(x) and ∆1(y) are disjoint, since x and y are disjoint. So:
|∆1(x) ∪∆1(y)| = |∆1(x)| + |∆1(y)| = δ1(x) + δ1(y)(iv)
Since ∆2(x) and ∆2(y) are contained, respectively, in C(x) and C(y),
which are disjoint, they are also disjoint. So:
|∆2(x) ∪∆2(y)| = δ2(x) + δ2(y)(v)
So,
δ1(x ∪ y)−δ2(x ∪ y)
= (δ1(x) + δ1(y))− (δ2(x) + δ2(y))
= (δ1(x) − δ2(x)) + (δ1(y)− δ2(y))
= δ(x) + δ(y)
Since ρ(x ∪ y) = ρ(x) + ρ(y), by (i), we know that θ(x ∪ y) = θ(x) + θ(y).
d. DEF+:
Suppose Qn  Sum(x, y, z)
So θ(z) = θ(x) + θ(y)
Clearly θ(x) ≤ θ(z)
Assume θ(x) = θ(z)
then θ(y) = 〈0, 0〉
So y = ∅
Let x′ = z, y′ = ∅ to satisfy DEF+
Assume θ(x) < θ(z)
then Qn  x
′ ∼ x
and x′ ⊂ z for some x′ since Qn  REP<
Let y′ = z − x′
So z = x′ ⋒ y′
Claim θ(y) = θ(y′) so Qn  y ∼ y
′
For θ(x′) + θ(y′) = θ(z) by DISJ∪
But θ(x′) = θ(x)
So θ(y′) = θ(z)− θ(x) = θ(y)
(Cancellation is valid for sizes because it is valid for rationals and integers.)
Conversely,
If θ(z) = θ(x′) + θ(y′)
and θ(x′) = θ(x)
and θ(y′) = θ(y)
then θ(z) = θ(x) + θ(y)
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Theorem 3.2.30. For any n > 0, Qn  DIVm iff m | n.
Proof.
⇒ θ(N) = 〈1, 0〉. Hence, if m disjoint sets of the same size exhaust N, they
must each have size 〈1/m, 0〉. But if x ∈ Qn, then θ(x) = 〈a/n, b〉, for
integral a and b. So b = 0 and a = n/m.
⇐ For each i, 0 ≤ i < n, let Ai = [nk+ i]. So N =
⋃
0≤i<nAi.
If i 6= j, then Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ and Qn  (Ai ∼ Aj) since θ(Ai) = θ(Aj) =
〈1/n, 0〉.
Letting p = n/m, group the n sets Ai into m collections with p members
in each:
B1, . . . , Bm
Letting bj =
⋃
Bj for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we have bj ∈ Qn and θ(bj) = 〈p/n, 0〉 =
〈1/m, 0〉.
Furthermore, b1 ∪ . . . bm = N.
Definition 3.2.31. If J 6= ∅ and J is finite, then the least common multiple
of J , µ(J), is the least k which is divisible by every member of J .
Remark. µ(J) always exists since the product of all members of J is divisible
by each member of J . Usually, the product is greater than µ(J).
Corollary 3.2.32. If J is finite, then
a. If BDIVn ⊢ DIVm, then m | n.
b. If BDIVJ ⊢ DIVm, then m | µ(J).
c. There are only finitely many m for which BDIVJ ⊢ DIVm.
Proof. Based on Theorem 3.3.20:
a. If m ∤ n, then Qn  BDIVn;¬DIVm
b. Qµ(J)  BDIVJ since it satisfies DIVj for each j ∈ J . But, if m ∤ µ(J),
then Qµ(J) 2 DIVm.
c. Immediate from (b), since only finitely many m divide µ(J).
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We are now ready to show that BDIVn 0 CS by finding a sentence in CS
which entails infinitely many DIVn sentences. Such sentences can be produced
by generalizing the notion of divisibility to all sets instead of applying it only
to the universe.
Definition 3.2.33.
a. If 0 ≤ n, then Timesn(x, y) is the formula:
∃x0 . . . ∃xn[x0 = ∅ ∧ xn = y ∧
∧
1≤i≤n
Sum(xi−1, x, xi)]
Timesn(x, y) says that y is the same size as the Sum of n sets, each the
same size as x.
b. If 0 ≤ m < n, then Modn,m(z) is the formula:
∃x∃y∃v∃w[T imesn(x, v) ∧ Unit(y) ∧ T imesm(y, w) ∧ Sum(v, w, z)]
Modn,m(z) says that z can be partitioned in n sets of the same size and
m atoms.
c. Divn(z) is the formula
Modn,0(z) ∨ . . . ∨Modn,n−1(z)
d. ADIVn is the sentence
∀xDivn(x)
Remark. We have taken this opportunity to formulate the divisibility predicates
purely in terms of size predicates. Notice that in the presence of BASIC,
MODn,m ≡ Modn,m(I)
and DIVn ≡ Divn(I)
Fact 3.2.34. CS ⊢ ADIVn, for every n.
Proof. Every set in every standard finite interpretation is a finite set, and all
finite sets are roughly divisible by every n.
Fact 3.2.35. BASIC;ADIVn ⊢:
a. ADIVnm , for all m
b. DIVn, and
c. DIVnm , for all m.
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Proof.
a. By induction on m: if m = 1, then nm = n, so ADIVn ⊢ ADIVnm .
If T ⊢ ADIVnk , A  T , and x ∈ A˙, then x can be partitioned into n
k
sets of the same size and i atoms, where i < nk. Each non-atomic set in
the partition can be further partitioned into n sets of the same size and
atoms, where j < n. Thus, we have partitioned x into nkn sets of the
same size and nkj + i atoms. But nkn = nk+1 and, since i < nk and
j < n, nkj + i < nk+1. Hence, A  ADIVnk+1 .
b. Obvious.
c. Immediate from (a) and (b).
Theorem 3.2.36. BDIVN 0 ADIVn for any n ¿ 1.
Proof. If BDIVN ⊢ ADIVn, then by compactness there is a finite set J such that
BDIVJ ⊢ ADIVn. But then BDIVJ ⊢ DIVnk for every k, by Fact 3.2.35c. But
this contradicts Fact 3.2.32, which says that BDIVJ entails only finitely many
DIVn sentences.
So, even if we add all of the DIV sentences to BASIC, we are left with a
theory weaker than CS. Since this weakness has arisen in the case of ADIV
sentences, it is reasonable to attempt an axiomatization of CS as follows:
Definition 3.2.37. CA ≡ BASIC ∪ {ADIVn | n > 0 }
The remainder of this chapter and the next two are devoted to showing that
CA is, indeed, a complete set of axioms for CS.
3.3 Remarks on showing that CA axiomatizes
CS
We know that CS ⊢ CA and we want to show that CA ≡ CS, i.e. that CA ⊢ CS.
To do so, it will be sufficient to show that every consistent extension of CA is
consistent with CS.
Fact 3.3.1.
a. (Lindenbaum’s lemma) Every consistent theory has a consistent, complete
extension.
b. If every consistent, complete extension of T2 is consistent with T1, then
T2 ⊢ T1.
Proof.
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a. [Monk, Theorem 11.13, p.200]
b. Suppose that T1 ⊢ φ, T2 0 φ. Then T = T2;¬φ is consistent. T has a
consistent, complete extension, T ′, by Lindenbaum’s lemma. Since T2 ⊆
T , T ′ is also a consistent, complete extension of T2. But T
′ is not consistent
with T1.
Definition 3.3.2. T ′ is a completion of T iff T ′ is a complete, consistent
extension of T .
To prove that every completion of CA is consistent with CS, we define two
kinds of completions of a theory.
Definition 3.3.3.
a. T ′ is a finite completion of T iff T ′ is true in some finite model of T .
b. T ′ is an infinite completion of T iff T ′ is true in some infinite model
of T .
Fact 3.3.4. If T ′ is a completion of T and BA ⊆ T , then (T ′ is a finite com-
pletion of T iff T ′ is not an infinite completion of T .)
Proof.
⇒ Suppose A is a finite model of T ′ with n atoms. Since T ′ is complete,
T ′ ⊢ EXACTLYn. So T ′ ⊢ ¬ATLEASTn+1 and has no infinite models.
⇐ T ′ ⊢ ATLEASTn for every n, so T ′ has no finite models.
Fact 3.3.5.
a. Every finite completion of CA is equivalent to CA;EXACTLYn, for some
n.
b. Every finite completion of CA is consistent with CS.
Proof.
a. CA ⊢ BASIC and, by Theorem 2.1.6, BASIC is categorical in every finite
power.
b. The model A of CA;EXACTLYn is a standard finite interpretation. So
A  CS.
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Definition 3.3.6.
a. CAI = CA ∪ INF
b. CSI = CS ∪ INF
So, to show that every completion of CA is consistent with CS, we may now
concentrate on showing that every completion of CAI is consistent with CSI.
What, then, are the completions of CAI? Recall that CA entails DIVn for
every n > 0, where DIVn is
MODn,0 ∨ . . . ∨MODn,n−1
Any completion, T , of CAI has to solve the disjunction DIVn for each n; T
has to entail one of the disjuncts. Remainder theories specify, for each n, the
number of atoms remaining when the universe is divided into n disjoint sets of
the same size.
Definition 3.3.7. Remainder functions and remainder theories
a. f : N+ → N is a remainder function iff 0 ≤ f(n) < n for all n ∈
Dom(f). (Henceforth f ranges over remainder functions.)
b. f is total iff Dom(f) = N+; otherwise f is partial.
c. f is finite iff Dom(f) is finite.
d. n is a solution for f iff for any i ∈ Dom(f), n ≡ f(i) mod i.
e. f is congruous iff for any i, j ∈ Dom(f), then gcd(i, j) | f(i) − f(j);
otherwise, f is incongruous.
f. The remainder theory specified by f , RTf , is the set of sentences {MODn,m | f(n) = m }.
g. If T is a theory, Tf = T ∪ RTf .
Chapter 5 will show that if f is total, CAIf is complete and that these are
the only complete extensions of CAI. In this section, we will show that CAIf is
consistent just in case CSIf is consistent.
Fact 3.3.8.
a. If f is finite, then f has a solution iff f is congruous iff f has infinitely
many solutions. [Griffin, Theorem 5-11, p.80]
b. f is congruous iff every finite restriction of f is congruous.
c. There are congruous f without any solutions. (Let f(p) = p − 1, for all
primes p. Any solution would have to be larger than every prime.)
Theorem 3.3.9.
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a. If f is finite, then CSf is consistent iff f is congruous.
b. CSf is consistent iff f is congruous.
c. CSIf is consistent iff f is congruous.
Proof.
a. (⇒)Let φ =
∧
RTf , Since CS;φ is consistent, there is some n such that
An  φ. So n is a solution of f and, hence, f is congruous by 3.3.8a.
(⇐)If f is congruous, f has a solution, n. So An  CS;φ
b. (⇒)For every finite restriction, g, of f , CSg is consistent. By (a), each
such g is congruous. Hence, f is congruous by 3.3.8b.
(⇐)Every finite restriction, g, of f is congruous. So CSg is consistent, by
(a). By compactness, then, CSf is consistent.
c. (⇒)If CSIf is consistent, so is CSf . So, by (b), f is congruous.
(⇐)By compactness, it is sufficient to show that every finite subtheory, T ,
of CSIf is consistent. But, if T is such a theory, then
T ⊆ CSg ∪ {ATLEAST i | i < n }
for some n and some finite restriction, g, of f . Since f is congruous, g is
as well, by 3.3.8b. So g has arbitrarily large solutions and CSg has finite
models large enough to satisfy T . Hence, T is consistent.
We now want to prove a similar theorem for CA, our proposed axiomatization
of CS. To do this, we must first establish that certain sentences are theorems
of CA.
Lemma 3.3.10. If n | m, 0 ≤ q < n, and p ≡ q mod n, then
CA ⊢ MODm,p → MODm,q.
Proof. Suppose A  MODm,p, k1 = m/n, and p = k2n + q. So, B(A) can be
partitioned into m sets of the same size
b1,1 . . . b1,n
b2,1 . . . b2,n
bk1,1 . . . bk1,n
and p atoms
a1,1 . . . a1,n
a2,1 . . . a2,n
ak2,1 . . . ak2,n
c1 . . . . . . cq
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For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let
Bi =
⋃
1≤j≤k1
bj,n ∪
⋃
1≤j≤k2
aj,n
Since A  DISJ∪, A  Bi ∼ Bj , for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Furthermore,
B(A) =
⋃
1≤i≤n
Bi ∪ (c1 . . . cq)
So, A MODn,q.
Lemma 3.3.11. If 0 ≤ p < q < m, then
CA ⊢ MODm,p → ¬MODm,q
Proof. Suppose A  MODm,p ∧ ¬MODm,q. Then:
A  x1 ∪ . . . xm ∪ a1 ∪ . . . ap = I
A  y1 ∪ . . . ym ∪ b1 ∪ . . . bq = I
where the a’s and b’s are atoms and the x’s (y’s) are disjoint sets of the same
size in A. Let
X = x1 ∪ · · · ∪ xm
Y = y1 ∪ · · · ∪ ym
A = a1 ∪ · · · ∪ ap
B = b1 ∪ · · · ∪ bp
B′ = bp+1 ∪ · · · ∪ bq
We claim that y1 < x1. For, if y1 ∼ x1, then X ∪ A ∼ Y ∪ B and if x1 < y1,
then X ∪ A < Y ∪B; neither is possible since Y ∪ B ⊂ I = X ∪ a. So yi < xi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Since A  REP<, there is a proper subset y′i of xi which is the
same size at yi.
Let zi = xi − y
′
i
and Y ′ = y′i ∪ · · · ∪ y
′
m
So Y ′ ∪ Z = X = I −A
and Y ′ ∪B′ = I −B.
But A ∼ B, since each is the disjoint union of p atoms. Thus (I − A) ∼
(I − B), by RC∼, so Y ′ ∪ Z ∼ Y ∪ B′. But Y ′ ∼ Y , since for each component
of Y , there is a component of Y ′ of the same size. So Z ∼ B′, by RC∼.
But Z must be larger than B′, for B′ is the union of fewer than m atoms
while Z is the union of m non-empty sets. So, the original supposition entails a
contradiction.
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Theorem 3.3.12.
a. If f is finite, then CAf is consistent iff f is congruous.
b. CAf is consistent iff f is congruous.
c. CAIf is consistent iff f is congruous.
Proof.
a. (⇒)Supposing that f is incongruous, there exist i, j, and k such that
k = gcd(i, j) and k ∤ (f(i)− f(j)). We will show that
CA ⊢ ¬(MODi,f(i) ∧MODj,f(j))(*)
from which it follows that CAf is inconsistent.
Let p and q be such that
0 ≤ p, q < k,
f(i) ≡ p mod k, and
f(j) ≡ q mod k
By lemma 3.3.10, we have
CA ⊢ MODi,f(i) → MODk,p, and(1)
CA ⊢MODj,f(j) → MODk,q(2)
since k | i and k | j. Since k ∤ f(i)− f(j), p 6= q. So lemma 3.3.11 yields
CA ⊢ MODk,p → ¬MODk,q(3)
From (1), (2), and (3) we may conclude (*).
(⇐)Follows from 3.3.9a since CAf ⊆ CSf .
b. See proof of 3.3.9b.
c. See proof of 3.3.9c.
Corollary 3.3.13. CAIf is consistent iff CSIf is consistent.
Proof. Immediate from 3.3.9c and 3.3.12c.
It might help to review our strategy before presenting the difficult parts of
the proof that CA ≡ CS. The main objective is (1), which follows from (2) by
3.3.1b.
(1) CA ⊢ CS
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(2) Every completion of CA is consistent with CS.
We already know that the finite completions of CA are consistent with CS
(see 3.3.5c) and that if CAIf is consistent, then CSIf is also consistent (see
3.3.12). So (2) is a consequence of (3).
(3) If T is a completion of CAI, then T ≡ CAIf for some total,
congruous f .
To establish (3), it is sufficient to prove (4) because every completion of CAI
entails CAIf for some total f .
(4) If f is total and congruous, then CAIf is complete.
To prove (4), we invoke the prime model test: If T is model complete and T
has a prime model, then T is complete (see Appendix, Fact C.3). So (4) follows
from (5) and (6).
(5) If f is total and congruous, then CAIf has a prime model.
(6) For any f , CAIf is model complete.
Finally, since any extension of a model complete theory is also model com-
plete (see Appendix, Fact C7a), we can infer (6) from (7).
(7) CAI is model complete.
So (1) follows from (5) and (7).
The proof outlined here will be carried out in Chapter 5. But first, we
consider a simpler theory, PSIZE, which deals only with sizes of sets and ignores
boolean relations. Chapter 4 formulates PSIZE and establishes that it is model
complete, a result we need for showing that CAI is model complete.
4The Pure Theory of Class
Sizes
CS is about sets; it makes claims about sets in terms of their boolean relations
and their size relations. In this chapter, we identify a theory, PCS (the pure
theory of class sizes), which is not about sets, but only about sizes of sets. Sizes,
here, are equivalence classes of sets which have the same size. PCS is formulated
in the language of size relations, L<.
PCS is worth examining in its own right, for if number theory is the theory
of cardinal numbers, then PCS is our version of number theory. But our main
reason for introducing PCS is to aid the proof that CA is model complete. For
this reason,we only give a sketchy treatment of PCS itself.
Section 1 defines PCS and develops a set of axioms, PCA, for it, as follows:
for each model, A, of BASIC, the size model, SA, consists of equivalence
classes drawn from A˙ under the same size relation; PCS is the set of statements
true in SA for any standard finite model, A. PCA consists of a theory, PSIZE,
which holds in SA whenever A  BASIC and a set of divisibility principles.
Using some results about model theory in section 2, Section 3 establishes
that PCA is model complete, the main result of this chapter and the only result
needed for subsequent proofs. This is done by reducing PCA to the theory Zgm,
whose models are Z-groups taken modulo some specific element.
Finally, section 4 indicates how PCA could be shown to axiomatize PCS.
This method is the same outlined in chapter 3 to show that CA ≡ CS.
4.1 Size models and PCS
Definition 4.1.1. Suppose A  BASIC.
a. If x is a member of A˙, then σA[x] is the size of x in A:
σA[x] = { y | A  (x ∼ y) }
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b. SA, the size model for A, is the interpretation of L< whose domain is{
σA[x] | x ∈ A˙
}
where
SA  σA[x] ∼ σA[y] iff A  x ∼ y
SA  σA[x] < σA[y] iff A  x < y
SA  Sum(σA[x], σA[y], σA[z]) iff A  Sum(x, y, z), and
SA  Unit(σA[x]) iff A  Atom(x)
c. The one-place operator x˜ is to be read as the complementary size of x:
SA  (y = x˜) iff SA  Sum(x, y, I)
These interpretations are well defined because the predicates are satisfied
by elements of A˙ in virtue of their sizes. For example, if A  Sum(x, y, z) and
A  z ∼ z′ , then A  Sum(x, y, z′).
Definition 4.1.2. PCS, the pure theory of class sizes, consists of all sen-
tences of L< which are true in the size model of every standard finite interpre-
tation of LC<.
Definition 4.1.3. PSIZE, the theory of sizes, consists of the following ax-
ioms:
Order axioms
¬(x < x)(IRREF<)
x < y ∧ y < z → x < z(TRANS<)
x ∼ y ↔ x = y(UNIQ∼)
x ≤ I(MAX)
0 ≤ x(MIN)
x < y ∨ x ∼ y ∨ y < x(TRICH)
Unit axioms
Unit(x)↔ (y < x↔ y = 0)
∃xUnit(x)
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Sum axioms
Sum(x, 0, x)(IDENT)
Sum(x, y, z)↔ Sum(y, x, z)(COMM)
Sum(x1, y, z1) ∧ Sum(x2, y.z2)→(MONOT)
(x1 < x2 ↔ z1 < z2)
Sum(x, y, w1) ∧ Sum(w1, z, w) ∧ Sum(y, z, w2)(ASSOC)
→ Sum(x,w2, w)
∃zSum(x, y1, z) ∧ y2 ≤ y1 → ∃zSum(x, y2, z)(EXIST
+)
x ≤ z → ∃ySum(x, y, z)(EXIST−)
Sum(x, x˜, I)(COMP)
Fact 4.1.4. If A  BASIC, then SA  PSIZE
Fact 4.1.5. PSIZE 0 PCS.
Proof. PSIZE fails to axiomatize PCS for the same reason that BASIC fails to
axiomatize CS: the lack of divisibility principles.
We offer PCA as an axiomatic version of PCS:
Definition 4.1.6. PCA, the pure class size axioms, is defined as:
PSIZE ∪ {ADIVn | n > 0 }
Fact 4.1.7. If A  CA, then SA  PCA
If A is a standard finite interpretation of BASIC with n atoms, then the
elements of SA can be regarded as the sequence 0, . . . , n with the usual ordering,
where
SA  Unit(x) iff x = 1
and
SA  Sum(i, j, k) iff (i + j) = k ≤ n
Once n is fixed, this is the only interpretation allowed by the axioms PSIZE. In
particular, MONOT rules out the interpretation in which Sum(i, j, k) is satisfied
just in case (i + j) ≡ k mod n+ 1.
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4.2 Some models and theories
We shall use Theorem 4.2.1a to show that PCA is model complete and Theorem
4.2.1b to show, in chapter 5, that CAI is model complete.
Theorem 4.2.1.
a. If T satisfies Monk’s Condition, then T is model complete.
Monk’s Condition. If A  T , B  T , A ⊆ B, and C is a
finitely generated submodel of B, then there is an isomorphism,
f : C → A such that if x ∈ C˙ ∩ A˙, then f(x) = x. f is a Monk
mapping.
b. If T is model complete and LT has no function symbols, then T satisfies
Monk’s Condition.
Proof.
a. [Monk, p.359]
b. If LT has no function symbols, then any finitely generated structure over
LT is finite. So, suppose C˙ contains a1, . . . , an (from A˙) and b1, . . . , bm
(from B˙-A˙). Let φ1 be the diagram of C and obtain φ2 from φ1 by sub-
stituting the variable xi for each constant ai and the variable yi for each
constant bi. Finally, let φ3 be
∃y1 . . . ∃ymφ2
So, φ3 is a primitive formula. B  φ3(a1, . . . , an), so A does as well, by
Fact C.5d in the Appendix. So, to obtain the desired isomorphism, map
the ai’s into themselves and map the bi’s into a sequence of elements of A˙
which can stand in for the existentially quantified variables of φ3.
In chapter 5, we use Monk’s Theorem to infer the model completeness of the
theory CA from that of PCA. To establish the model completeness of PCA, we
use Fact 4.2.2.
Fact 4.2.2.
a. If T1 is model complete and T1 ⊢ T2, then T2 is also model complete.
b. If T is model complete in L, and L′ is an expansion of L by adjoining new
individual constants, then T is model complete in L′. [Monk, p.355]
Definition 4.2.3. Suppose L1 and L2 are first order languages and L12 = L1−
L2. A translation (simple translation) of L1 into L2 is a function, τ , which:
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a. assigns to the universal quantifier a (quantifier free) formula, τ∀, of L2
with exactly one free variable.
b. assigns to each n-place predicate, P , in L12 a (quantifier free) formula,
τP , of L2 with exactly n free variables, and
c. assigns to each n-place function symbol, O, in L12 a (quantifier free) for-
mula, τO, of L2 with exactly (n+ 1) free variables.
Definition 4.2.4. If τ is a translation of L1 into L2, then τ extends to all
formulae of L1 as follows:
a. Predicates and function symbols of L2 are translated into themselves.
b.
τ(φ ∨ ψ) = τ(φ) ∨ τ(ψ)
τ(φ ∧ ψ) = τ(φ) ∧ τ(ψ)
τ(¬φ) = ¬τ(φ)
τ(∀xφ) = ∀x(τ∀(x)→ φ)
τ(∃xφ) = ∃x(τ∀(x) ∧ φ)
Definition 4.2.5. If τ is a translation of L1 into L2, then
a. The functional assumptions of τ are the sentences:
∀x1 . . . ∀xn(τ∀(x1) ∧ . . . ∧ τ∀(xn))→
∃y1(τ∀(y1) ∧ ∀y2(τO(x1, . . . , xn, y2)↔ y1 = y2))
where O is a function symbol in L1 but not in L2.
b. The existential assumption of τ is
∃xτ∀(x)
The functional assumptions of a translation say that the formulas which
translate function symbols yield unique values within the relevant part of the
domain when given values in the relevant part of the domain. The relevant
part of the domain is the set of elements which satisfy the interpretation of
universal quantifier. The existential assumption of a translation says that that
subdomain is non-empty. Notice that the existential and functional assumptions
of a translation are sentences of L2.
A translation from L2 into L1 induces a mapping from interpretations of L2
into interpretations of L1.
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Definition 4.2.6. If τ is a translation from L1 into L2 and B is an interpreta-
tion of L2 which satisfies the existential and functional assumptions of τ , then
τ(B) is the interpretation A of L1 such that:
a. A˙ is the set of elements of B˙ which satisfy τ∀.
b. A interprets all predicates and function symbols common to L1 and L2 in
the same way that B does.
c. A interprets all predicates and function symbols in L12 in accordance with
the translations assigned by τ .
A  P (~x) iff B  τP (~x)
A  y = O(~x) iff B  τO(~x, y)
The following condition on theories allows us to infer the model completeness
of one from the model completeness of the other.
Definition 4.2.7.
a. If τ is a translation from L1 to L2, then T1 is τ-reducible to T2 iff for
every model A of T1 there is a model B of T2 such that A = τ(B).
b. T1 is reducible (simply reducible) to T2 iff there is a (simple) transla-
tion, τ , for which T1 is τ-reducible to T2.
c. T1 is uniformly τ-reducible to T2 iff for any models, A1 and B1, such
that A1  T1 and B1  T1, and A1 ⊆ B1, there exist models A2 and B2
such that A2  T2 and B2  T2, and A2 ⊆ B2 A1 = τ(A2) and B1 = τ(B2),
Lemma 4.2.8. Suppose that T1 is τ-reducible to T2 and that A1 = τ(A2).
Then, for any primitive formula, φ, of L1 and any sequence, ~x ∈ A1,
A1  φ(~x) iff A2  τφ(~x)
Proof. Suppose
φ(~x) = ∃y1 . . . ∃ynφ
′(~x)
where φ′(~x) is a conjunction of atomic formulae and negations of atomic formu-
lae. Then
A1  φ(~x) iff A1  ∃y1 . . . ∃ynφ
′(~x, y1, . . . , yn)
iff A1  φ
′(~x, b1, . . . , bn), for bi ∈ A˙
iff A2  τφ′(~x, b1, . . . , bn)
iff A2  ∃y1 . . . ∃yn
(τ∀(y1) ∧ . . . ∧ τ∀(yn) ∧ φ
′(~x, y1, . . . , yn))
iff A2  τφ(~x)
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Theorem 4.2.9. If T2 is model complete, τ is a simple translation from LT1
to LT2 , and T1 is uniformly τ-reducible to T2, then T1 is also model complete.
Proof. By Fact C.5d in the Appendix, it is enough to show that given models
A1 and B1 of T1, where A1 ⊆ B1 and a primitive formula, φ:
If B1  φ(~x) for ~x ∈ A˙
then A1  φ(~x)
Since T1 is uniformly τ -reducible to T2, there are models of T2, A2 ⊆ B2, where
A1 = τ(A2) and B1 = τ(B2)
Since B1  φ(~x) by assumption
then B2  τφ(~x) by lemma 4.2.8
So A2  τφ(~x) since T2 is model complete
and A1  φ(~x) by lemma 4.2.8
We shall now define several theories, all more or less familiar, which will
serve in showing that our theory of size is model complete.
Definition 4.2.10.
a. The theory of abelian groups with identity has the following axioms
x+ (y + z) = (x+ y) + z(1)
x+ y = y + x(2)
x+ 0 = x(3)
∃y(x+ y = 0)(4)
b. The theory of cancellable abelian semigroups with identity consists
of (1), (2), and (3) above and:
x+ y = x+ z → y = z(4′)
c. The axioms of simple order are:
x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ z → x ≤ z(5)
x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x→ x = y(6)
x ≤ x(7)
x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x(8)
d. The theory of Z-groups, Zg , has the following axioms
(i) The axioms for abelian groups with identity,
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(ii) The axioms for simple order,
(iii) The following additional axioms:
y ≤ z → x+ y ≤ x+ z(9)
1 is the least element greater than 0(10)
∀x∃y(ny = x ∨ . . . ∨ ny = x+ (n− 1))(11)
for each positive n, where ny stands for:
y + · · ·+ y︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
e. The theory of N-semigroups has the following axioms:
(i) The axioms for cancellable abelian semigroups with identity,
(ii) The axioms of simple order,
(iii) Axioms (9) and (10) of Zg, and
(iv) The additional axiom:
0 ≤ x(12)
f. The theory of Z-groups modulo I, Zgm, consists of the following ax-
ioms:
(i) The axioms for abelian groups with identity,
(ii) The axioms for simple order
(iii) Axioms (10) and (11) of Zg, axiom (12) from the theory of N-semigroups,
and
(iv) The following additional axioms
(y ≤ z ∧ x ≤ x+ z)→ x+ y ≤ x+ z)(13)
x ≤ I(14)
The theory of Z-groups is taken from [Chang, p. 291]
Fact 4.2.11.
a. Zg is the complete theory of 〈Z,+, 0, 1,≤〉. [Chang, p.291]
b. Zg is model complete.[Robinson]
Theorem 4.2.12.
a. The theory of N-semigroups is model complete.
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b. The theory of Z-groups modulo I is model complete.
Proof.
a. Every abelian semigroup with cancellation can be isomorphically embed-
ded in an abelian group [Kurosh, pp. 44-48]. It is clear from the con-
struction in [Kurosh] that if the semigroup is ordered, the abelian group
in which it is embedded may also be ordered and that the elements of
the semigroup will be the positive elements of the group. Moreover, the
(rough) divisibility of the elements in the semigroup will be carried over
to the group.
Consequently, the theory of N-semigroups is uniformly reducible to the
theory of Z groups by the translation:
τ∀ = p0 ≤ xq
Since the latter is model complete, so is the former, by 4.2.9.
b. First, consider the theory of N-semigroups in the language which contains,
besides the constant symbols in the original theory, an individual constant,
I. The theory of N-semigroups is model-complete in this language, by
4.2.2b.
We claim that the theory of Z-groups modulo I is uniformly reducible to
this new theory by the following translation:
τ∀ = px ≤ Iq
τ+ = px+ y = z ∨ x+ y = I + zq
(The construction: given a model of Zgm, stack up ω many copies of the
model, assigning interpretations in the obvious way. The result is an N-
semigroup and the original model is isomorphic to the first copy of itself.)
In the next section, we use Theorem 4.2.9 to show that PSIZE is model
complete, by reducing it to the theory of Z-groups modulo I. Chapter 5 uses
Monk’s Theorem to show that CA is model complete.
4.3 PCA is model complete
To show that PCA is model complete, we shall reduce it to Zgm, the theory of
Z-groups with addition taken modulo some constant (see 4.2.11). The model
completeness of PCA then follows from the model completeness of Zgm (Fact
4.2.12) and Theorem 4.2.9. Specifically, we shall show that every model of PCA
is the τ -image of a model of Zgm, where τ is the following translation.
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Definition 4.3.1. Let τ be the translation from LPSIZE to LZgm where:
τ∀ = px = xq
τSum(x,y,z) = px+ y = z ∧ x ≤ zq
τUnit(x) = px = 1q
τx˜ = px+ y = Iq
τx<y = px ≤ y ∧ x 6= yq
τ∅ = px = 0q
Given a model, A, of PCA, we can construct a model, ZA, of Zgm directly:
Definition 4.3.2. If A  PSIZE, then ZA is the interpretation of LZgm in
which:
Z˙A = A˙(a)
ZA  (x ≤ y) iff A  (x < y ∨ x = y)(b)
ZA(I) = A(I)(c)
ZA(0) = A(0)(d)
ZA  (x+ y = z) iff A  Sum(x, y, z)(e)
or A  ∃a∃wUnit(a)
∧ Sum(x˜, y˜, w) ∧ Sum(w, a, z˜)
ZA  (x = 1) iff A  Unit(x)(f)
Fact 4.3.3j establishes that 4.3.2 gives Sum a functional interpretation. The-
orem 4.3.8 establishes that ZA  Zgm, on the basis of the intervening facts: 4.3.3
deals with the model A of PSIZE; 4.3.4 deals with the corresponding model ZA;
4.3.6 verifies some connections between A and ZA.
Fact 4.3.3. The following are theorems of PSIZE. (Sm(x, y) abbreviates ∃zSum(x, y, z).
)
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Sum(x, y, z1) ∧ Sum(x, y, z2)→ z1 = z2 (UNIQ
+)(a)
Sum(x, y1, z) ∧ Sum(x, y2, z)→ y1 = y2 (UNIQ
−)(b)
Sum(x, y, w1) & Sum(w1, z, w)→ (ASSOC2)(c)
∃w2(Sum(y, z, w2) ∧ Sum(x,w2, w))
˜˜x = x(d)
x < y ↔ y˜ < x˜(e)
x < y ∧ y < y˜ → x < x˜(f)
Sm(x, y) ∨ Sm(x˜, y˜)(g)
Sum(x, y, z)→ Sum(z˜, y, x˜)(h1)
Sum(x, y, z)→ Sum(x, z˜, y˜)(h2)
Sum(x, y, z1) ∧ Sum(x˜, y˜, z˜2)→ (z1 = z2 = I)(i)
∃z1Sum(x, y, z1)↔(j)
¬∃a∃w∃z2(Unit(a) ∧ Sum(x˜, y˜, w) ∧ Sum(w, a, z˜2))
Proof. The proofs are elementary.
In addition to the theorems of PSIZE listed in 4.3.3, we require a battery of
tedious facts about the model ZA. We shall state these in terms of the model
ẐA, an expansion of both A and ZA, which interprets two additional operators,
as follows:
Definition 4.3.4. Given a model A of PSIZE, ẐA is the expansion of ZA
induced by the definitions in 4.3.2 together with (a) and (b):
ẐA  y = −x iff ZA  x+ y = 0(a)
ẐA  z = x− y iff ZA  z = x+−y(b)
Remark. Given a model A of PSIZE: for each x in Z˙A, there is a unique y
such that:
ZA  x+ y = 0
Proof.
a. If x = 0, then ZA  x+ y = 0 iff y = 0.
⇒
If ZA  0 + y = 0
then A  Sum(∅, y, ∅) by 4.3.2e
But A  Sum(∅, ∅, ∅) by IDENT
So ZA  y = 0 by UNIQ
−
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⇐ Obvious
b. If x > 0, there is a unique y which satisfies
Sum(x˜, a, y), where Unit (a)(*)
since there is a unique unit and A  UNIQ+.
But ZA  x+ y = 0 iff A  (*).
⇒
If ZA  x+ y = 0
then A  Sum(x˜, y˜, w)
and A  Sum(w, a, ∅˜) since A 2 Sum(x, y, 0)
But A  ∅˜ = I
So A  w = a˜ by COMP and UNIQ−
So A  Sum(x˜, y˜, a˜)
So A  Sum(x˜, a, y) by 4.3.3d and h2
⇐
If A  (*)
then A  Sum(x˜, y˜, a˜) by 4.3.3h2
and A  Sum(a˜, a, ∅˜) by COMP
So ZA  x+ y = 0 by 4.3.2e
Fact 4.3.5. ẐA satisfies the following:
−(x+ y) = −x+−y(a)
−(x− y) = y − x(b)
(x+ y)− y = x(c)
−(−x) = x(d)
x 6= 0 ∧ x < y → −y < −x(e)
Proof. Omitted.
Fact 4.3.6. ẐA satisfies the following:
a. Sm(a, b)↔ Sum(a, b, a+ b)
b. c ≤ b↔ Sum(c, b− c, b)
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c. Sum(a, b, c) ∧ 0 < b→ Sum(a,−c,−b)
Sum(a, b, c) ∧ 0 < a→ Sum(−c, b,−a)
d. ¬Sm(a, b)→ (Sm(−a,−b) ∨ b = −a)
Proof.
a. (⇒)
Suppose Sm(a, b)
So Sum(a, b, w) for some w
So (a+ b) = w by 4.3.2e
So Sum(a, b, a+ b)
(⇐)Obvious.
b. (⇒)
Suppose c ≤ b
then Sum(c, w, b) for some w by EXIST−
So b = c+ w by (a) and UNIQ+
So b − c = (c+ w)− c
So b − c = w by 4.3.5c
So Sum(c, b − c, b)
(⇐)
Suppose Sum(c, b − c, b)
But Sum(c, 0, c) by IDENT
So 0 ≤ (b− c)↔ b ≤ c by MONOT and UNIQ+
So b ≤ c by MIN
c.
Suppose Sum(a, b, c)
and 0 < b
then c = (a+ b) by (a) and UNIQ+
So c− b = (a+ b)− b
So c− b = a by 4.3.5c
So − b = a− c by 4.3.5c
So Sum(a,−c,−b) if Sm(a,−c) by (a)
But if a = 0
then Sm(a,−c) by IDENT
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And if a 6= 0
then a < c, since 0 < b by MONOT and UNIQ+
So − c < −a by 4.3.5e
So − c ≤ a˜ by 4.3.4
But Sm(a, a˜) by IDENT
So Sm(a,−c) by EXIST+
d.
Suppose ¬Sm(a, b)
But b = (a+ b)− a, by 4.3.5c
So ¬Sum(a, (a+ b)− a, a+ b), by (a)
So ¬(a ≤ a+ b), by (b)
So (a+ b) < a, by TRICH
But if (a+ b) 6= 0
then − a < −(a+ b), by 4.3.5e
So − a < −a+−b, by 4.3.5a
So Sum(−a, (−a+−b)− (−a),−a+−b), by (b)
But (−a+−b)− (−a) = −b, by 4.3.5c
So Sum(−a,−b,−a+−b)
So Sm(−a,−b)
And if (a+ b) = 0
then b = −a
We can now show that ZA  Zgm. The only real difficulty arises in verifying
that addition is associative. We need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.7. ZA  (a+ c) + (b− c) = a+ b
Proof. We shall work through successively more general cases:
a. When Sm(a, b) and c ≤ b
We know Sum(b− c, c, b) by 4.3.6b
and Sum(b, a, a+ b) by 4.3.6a
So ∃w(Sum(c, a, w)
∧ Sum(b − c, w, a+ b) by ASSOC2
So w = c+ a by 4.3.6a and UNIQ+
and a+ b = (b− c) + (c+ a) by 4.3.6a and UNIQ+
So a+ b = (a+ c) + (b− c)
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b. When Sm(a, b) and Sm(a, c)
If c ≤ b, Case (a) applies directly
So assume b < c
then a+ c = (a+ b) + (c− b) by Case (a)
So (a+ c)− (c− b) = a+ b by 4.3.5c
So (a+ c) +−(c− b) = a+ b by 4.3.4b
So (a+ b) + (b− c) = a+ b by 4.3.5b
c. Sm(a, b)
If Sm(a, c) Case (b) applies
So assume ¬Sm(a, c) and thus b < c by EXIST+
So Sum(b, c− b, c) by 4.3.6b
and 0 < c− b by MONOT
So Sum(b,−c,−(c− b)) by 4.3.6c
So Sum(b,−c, b− c) by 4.3.5b
So Sum(−c, b, b− c) (c1)
Either Sm(−a,−c) or c = −a since ¬Sm(a, c) by 4.3.6d
Assume Sm(−a,−c)
then Sum(−a,−c,−a+−c) by 4.3.6a
So Sum(−a,−c,−(a+ c)) by 4.3.5a
and 0 < −a
So Sum(−(−(a+ c)),−c,−(−a)) by 4.3.6c
So Sum(a+ c,−c, a) by 4.3.5d (c2)
Assume c = −a
then a+ c = 0
and a = −c
Hence Sum(a+ c,−c, a) by (c2)
and Sum(−c, b, b− c) by (c1)
and Sum(a, b, a+ b) since Sm(a, b)
So Sum(a+ c, b− c, a+ b) by ASSOC
So (a+ c) + (b − c) = a+ b by 4.3.6a
d. Whenever
Suppose ¬Sm(a, b), for otherwise case c applies.
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Either Sm(−a,−b) or b = −a by 4.3.6d
Assume b = −a
then a+ b = 0
and b− c = (−a)− c
= −a+−c
= −(a+ c)
So (a+ b) + (b− c)
= (a+ c) +−(a+ c)
= 0 = a+ b
Assume Sm(−a,−b)
then − a+−b = (−a+−c) + (−b−−c) by case c
So − (a+ b) = −(a+ c) +−(b− c) by 4.3.5a
So − (a+ b) = −((a+ c) + (b− c)) by 4.3.5a
So a+ b = (a+ c) + (b− c) by 4.3.5d
Theorem 4.3.8. ZA  Zgm
Proof. The only axiom for abelian groups that needs further verification is as-
sociativity. We prove this using lemma 4.3.7:
x+ (y + z) = (x + y) + ((y + z)− y), by 4.3.7
= (x + y) + z, by 4.3.5c
The ordering axioms of Zgm are satisfied in ZA because ZA uses the same
ordering as A, A  PSIZE, and PSIZE includes the same ordering axioms.
ZA satisfies axiom (10) of Zgm becauseA satisfies the UNIT axiom of PSIZE.
The divisibility of elements in ZA required by axiom (11) of Zgm is guaran-
teed by the fact that A satisfies the divisibility principles of PCA.
Similarly, ZA satisfies axioms (12), and (14) of Zgm because A satisfies MIN
and MAX.
Axiom (13) of Zgm is:
y ≤ z ∧ x ≤ x+ z → x+ y ≤ x+ z
If ZA  x ≤ x+ z
then A  Sum(x, z, x+ z)
Since ZA  y < z
then A  Sum(x, y, x + y) by EXIST+
and A  x+ y ≤ x+ z by MONOT
So ZA  x+ y ≤ x+ z
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So, we PCA is τ -reducible to Zgm. The reduction is uniform since each
model A of PCA has the same domain as its Zgm-model. So, we may conclude
that PCA is model complete.
Theorem 4.3.9.
a. PCA is model complete.
b. PCA satisfies Monk’s condition.
Proof.
a. Apply Theorem 4.2.9.
b. Immediate from (a) and 4.2.1(b).
4.4 Remarks on showing that PCA axiomatizes
PCS
To prove that PCA ≡ PCS, we could follow the method outlined at the end of
chapter 3 for showing that CA ≡ CS.
We already know that PCS ⊢ PCA, so we need only prove (1), which follows
from (2) by 3.3.1b.
(1) PCA ⊢ PCS
(2) Every completion of PCA is consistent with PCS.
But (2) is equivalent to the conjunction of (2a) and (2b).
(2a) Every finite completion of PCA is consistent with PCS.
(2b) Every infinite completion of PCA is consistent with PCS.
The finite completions of PCA are the theories PCA;EXACTLYn. But
PCA;EXACTLYn is true in SA, where A is the standard finite interpretation
of LC< containing n atoms. So, the finite completions of PCA are consistent
with PCS. (Formally, we would have to define EXACTLYn in terms of units
rather than atoms.)
Letting PCAI = PCA+ INF and PCSI = PCS+ INF, (2b) is a consequence
of (3a) and (3b).
(3a) If PCAIf is consistent, then PCSIf is consistent.
(3b) If T is a completion of PCAI, then T ≡ PCAIf , for some f .
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To prove (3a), we would have to prove analogues of 3.3.9 through 3.3.13 for
PCA and PCS. This seems straightforward, but tedious. The trick is to show
that enough axioms about size have been incorporated in PCA to establish the
entailments among MOD statements.
To prove (3b), it is sufficient to demonstrate (4), because every completion
of PCAI entails PCAIf for some total f .
(4) If f is total, then PCAIf is complete.
But PCA is model complete, so only (5) remains to be shown.
(5) If f is total and congruous, then PCAIf is has a prime model.
We will not construct prime models for the extensions of PCAI. It’s apparent
that the size models of the prime models for CAIf would do nicely. Alternatively,
the construction could be duplicated in this simpler case.
5Completeness of CA
5.1 Model completeness of CA
We shall show that CA is model complete by showing that it satisfies Monk’s
criterion (see 4.3.1). So, given Assumption 5.1.1, we want to prove 5.1.2.
Assumption 5.1.1. A  CA, B  CA, A ⊆ B , and C is a finitely generated
substructure of B.
Theorem 5.1.2. There is an isomorphic embedding, f : C → A, where
f(x) = x if x ∈ C˙ ∩ A˙
The Monk mappings for PCA can serve as a guide in constructing Monk
mappings for CA. The existence of Monk mappings for PCA tells us that we
can find elements with the right sizes. DISJ∪ and REP< then allow us to find
elements with those sizes that fit together in the right way.
Strictly speaking, SA is not a submodel of SB, so we cannot apply Monk’s
Theorem directly. But, let
SB(X) = the submodel of SB whose domain is { σB[x] | x ∈ X }
Then, clearly,
SA ≃ SB(A) ⊆ SB, and
SC ≃ SB(C), a finitely generated submodel of SB.
Monk’s Theorem applies directly to SB(A), SB, and SB(C), so we may con-
clude 5.1.3:
Fact 5.1.3. There is an isomorphic embedding, g : SC → SA, where
g(σB[x]) = σA[x] for all x ∈ C˙ ∩ A˙.
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That is to say, the sizes of elements in C can be embedded in the sizes of
elements in A. It remains to be shown that the elements of C themselves can be
mapped into A by a function which preserves boolean relations as well as size
relations.
C is a finite, and hence atomic, boolean algebra, though its atoms need not
be atoms of B; indeed, if B is infinite, there must be some atoms of C which are
not atoms of B since the union of all atoms of C is the basis of B.
Definition 5.1.4. d is a molecule iff d ∈ C˙ ∩ A˙ and no proper subset of d is
in C˙ ∩ A˙.
C˙ ∩ A˙ is a boolean algebra whose basis is the same as the basis of C. So
every atom of C is included in some molecule. The embedding f has to map
each molecule to itself. Moreover, f has to be determined by its values on C
since f must preserve unions. In fact, the atoms of C can be partitioned among
the molecules. So, if
d = b1 ∪ . . . ∪ bn
where d is a molecule and b1, . . . , bn are the atoms of C contained in d, then d
must also be the (disjoint) union of f(b1), . . . , f(bn). If this condition is satisfied,
f will preserve boolean relations. f must also select images with appropriate
sizes.
Proof. Proof of 5.1.2 Given a molecule, d, let b1, . . . , bn be the atoms of C
contained in d. For each bi, let ci be some member of g(σB[bi]) These elements
will be elements of A˙, since g yields sizes in A whose members are in A˙. These
elements have the right sizes, as we will show below, but they are in the wrong
places. We have no guarantee that they are contained in the molecule d. So we
still need to show that there are disjoint elements of A˙, a1, . . . , an whose union
is d and whose sizes are the same as those of b1, . . . , bn, respectively. Well,
Suppose d = b1 ∪ . . . ∪ bn
So C  Sum(b1, . . . , bn, d)
So SC  Sum(σB [b1], . . . , σB[bn], σB[d])
So SA  Sum(g(σB[b1]), . . . , g(σB[bn]), g(σB[d]))
So SA  Sum(c1, . . . , cn, d)
since each ci ∈ g(σB[bi]) and d ∈ g(σB[d]) = σA[d]. So, the existence of
a1, . . . , an, as above, is guaranteed because A  DEF+.
Now, let f(bi) = ai for each bi in the molecule d. Repeating this procedure
for each molecule yields a value of f for each atom of C. Finally, if x ∈ C˙ is
non-atomic, then
x = b1 ∪ . . . ∪ bk
where each bk is atomic. So let
f(x) = f(b1) ∪ . . . ∪ f(bk)
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f satisfies the requirements of Theorem 5.1.2: Boolean relations are preserved
by f because the function is determined by its values on the atoms of C; f
maps elements of C ∩ A into themselves because the set of atoms contained in
each of these molecules is mapped into a disjoint collection of elements of A˙
whose union is the same molecule; so, we need only show that f preserves size
relations. To do so, we invoke lemma 5.1.6, below:
C  x < y iff A  f(x) < f(y)(a)
C  x ∼ y iff A  f(x) ∼ f(y)(b)
C  Sum(x, y, z) iff A  Sum(f(x), f(y), f(z))(c)
C  Unit(x) iff A  Unit(y)(d)
Proof of (a): (The others are similar).
C  x < y iff SB  σB[x] < σB[y]
iff SA  g(σB[x]) < g(σB[y])
iff SA  σA[f(x)] < σA[f(y)] by 5.1.6
iff A  f(x) < f(y)
So, we may conclude:
Theorem 5.1.5. CA is model complete.
Lemma 5.1.6. For all x in C˙,
σA[f(x)] = g(σB[x])
Proof. Suppose
x = b1 ∪ · · · ∪ bn
where each bi is an atom of C˙.
So B  Sum(b1, . . . , bn, x) since B  DISJ∪
So SB  Sum(σB[b1], . . . , σB[bn], σB[x])
So SA  Sum(g(σB[b1]), . . . , g(σB[bn]), g(σB[x])) since SA ⊆ SB
But g(σB[b]) = σA[f(b)] by the choice of f(b).
So SA  Sum(σA[f(b1)], . . . , σA[f(bn)], g(σB[x]))
But A  Sum(f(b1), . . . , f(bn), f(x)) since A  DISJ∪
So SA  Sum(σA[f(b1)], . . . , σA[f(bn)], σA[f(x)])
So g(σB[x]) = σA[f(x)] since SA  UNIQ+
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5.2 Prime models for CA
For each total, congruous remainder function, f , we want to find a prime model,
Qf , for CAIf . All of these prime models can be defined over the class, Q, of
sets near quasi-congruence classes (see section 3.2). For different remainder
functions, we need to assign different size relations over Q. Section 5.2.1 defines
the structures Qf and verifies that each satisfies the respective theory, CAIf .
Section 5.2.2 defines, for each model of CAIf , a submodel, or shell. Section
5.2.3 shows that Qf is isomorphic to the shell of any model of CAIf .
5.2.1 The standard protomodels
The construction here is a more elaborate version of the construction of Q in
chapter 3 (see 3.2.19). Q turns out to be Qf , where f(n) = 0 for all n. As in
the case of Q, the models Qf and their copies in arbitrary models of CAI are
unions of chains.
The sizes assigned to elements of Q to induce Qf for a total, congruous
remainder function, f , are more elaborate than those used in the definition of
Q (see 3.2.22), but they are employed in substantially the same way:
Definition 5.2.1.
a. A size is an ordered pair 〈ρ, δ〉, where both ρ and δ are rational.
b. If θ1 = 〈ρ1, δ1〉 and θ2 = 〈ρ2, δ2〉 are sizes, then
(i) θ1 < θ2 iff ρ1 < ρ2 or ρ1 = ρ2 and δ1 < δ2.
(ii) θ1 + θ2 = 〈ρ1 + ρ2, δ1 + δ2〉
(cf 3.2.22)
To assign sizes for Qf we rely on the representation of sets in Q defined in
3.2.24. Qf , unlike Q, assigns different sizes to the n-congruence classes for a
given n.
Definition 5.2.2. If f is total and congruous, then
a. If x is an n-congruence class, x = [nk+ i], then
θf (x) =
{
〈 1
n
, n−f(n)
n
〉, if i < f(n),
〈 1
n
, −f(n)
n
〉, if f(n) ≤ i.
b. If x ∈ QCn, so that x is the disjoint union of n-congruence classes,
x1 ∪ . . . ∪ xk
then
θf (x) = θf (x1) + · · ·+ θf (xk)
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c. If x is finite, then
θf (x) = 〈0, |x|〉
d. If x ∈ Q, so that x can be represented as
(C(x) ∪∆1(x)) −∆2(x)
as in 3.2.24, then
θf (x) = θf (C(x)) + θf (∆1(x)) − θf (∆2(x))
= θf (C(x)) + 〈0, |∆1(x)|〉 − 〈0, |∆2(x)|〉
= θf (C(x)) + 〈0, |∆1(x)| − |∆2(x)|〉
Intuitively, all n-congruence classes are assigned sizes 〈1/n, δ〉, but δ is no
longer 0 in all cases, as in Q. Instead, the first f(n) n-congruence classes are
each one atom larger that the remaining (n− f(n)) n-congruence classes.
The desired models of CAI may now be defined:
Definition 5.2.3. If f is total and congruous, then the standard protomodel
for f is Qf , where
Q˙{ = Q
Qf  x < y iff θf (x) < θf (y)
Qf  x ∼ y iff θf (x) = θf (y)
Qf  Unit(x) iff θf (x) = 〈0, 1〉
Qf  Sum(x, y, z) iff θf (z) = θf (x) + θf (y)
(cf 3.2.27)
To verify that the structure Qf is a model of CAIf , for total and congruous
f , we exhibit each such model as the union of a chain of models.
Definition 5.2.4. If f is total and congruous, then Qf,n is the submodel of Qf
whose domain is Qn.
Fact 5.2.5. If f is total and congruous and n > 0, then Qf,n  BASIC.
Proof. The proof can be obtained from the proof of Theorem 3.2.29 by substi-
tuting:
Qf,n for Qn,
θf (x) for θ(x),
ρf (x) for ρ(x), and
δf (x) for δ(x)
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The following notion is helpful in understanding our constructions.
Definition 5.2.6. Suppose A  BASIC, x ∈ A˙, and 0 ≤ m < n. Then an
(n.m)-partition of x in A is a sequence x1, . . . , xn, where
a. x = x1 ∪ . . . ∪ xn
b. If 0 < i < j ≤ n, then xi ∩ xj = ∅, and
c. The xi are approximately the same size:
(i) If 0 < i < j ≤ m, then xi ∼ xj,
(ii) If m < i < j ≤ n, then xi ∼ xj ,
(iii) If 0 < i ≤ m < j ≤ n, then Sum(xi, a, xj), for any atom a,
In other words, x is partitioned among n pairwise disjoint sets which are roughly
the same size: each of the first m is one atom larger than each of the remaining
n−m. If 0 < i ≤ m, xi is called a charmed n-factor of x; for i > m, xi is a
common n-factor of x.
The sequence Qf,n does not constitute a chain of models. For example Qf,3
is not an extension of Qf,2. But this sequence does harbor a chain of models:
Fact 5.2.7. If n > m, then Qf,n! ⊆ Qf,m!.
Proof. It will be clearer, and easier, to establish this by example rather than by
formal proof. Letting n = 2 and m = 3, we want to show that the 2-congruence
classes have the same size relations in Qf,6 as they do in Qf,2, for any f . The
other elements ofQf,6 will then fall into place, since size relations are determined
by the representations of each set, x, as C(x), ∆1(x), and ∆2(x).
Suppose that f(2) = 0, so that
Qf,2  [2n] ∼ [2n+ 1]
Since f is congruous, f(6) ∈ {0, 2, 4}. If f(6) = 0, then all of the 6-congruence
classes are common. If f(6) = 2, then [6n] and [6n+ 1] are the only charmed 3-
congruence classes. If f(6) = 4, then all of the 3-congruence classes are charmed
except for [6n+ 4] and [6n+ 5].
In any case, [2n] will include the same number of charmed 3-congruence
classes as [2n+ 1], so
Qf,6  [2n] ∼ [2n+ 1]
Suppose, however that f(2) = 1, so that
Qf,2  [2n] is one atom larger than [2n+ 1]
Here, f(6) ∈ {1, 3, 5}, since f is congruous. In any case, [2n] contains exactly
one more charmed congruence class than [2n+ 1], so
Qf,6  [2n] is one atom larger than [2n+ 1]
So it goes in general.
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Fact 5.2.7 allows us to regard Qf as the union of a chain of models:
Fact 5.2.8. If f is total and congruous, then
Qf =
⋃
n>0
Qf,n!
Fact 5.2.9. If f is total and congruous, then
a. Qf  BASIC
b. Qf  ADIVk, for k > 0
c. Qf  MODn,f(n), for n > 0
d. Qf  CAIf
Proof.
a. BASIC is a universal-existential theory; so it is preserved under unions of
chains. (See Appendix, Fact B.5).
b. Each n-congruence class can be partitioned into k nk-congruence classes.
c. Qf,n  MODn,f(n), by definition. Since MODn,f(n) is an existential sen-
tence, it is preserved under extensions.
d. Immediate from (a), (b), and (c).
5.2.2 Shells of models
To embed the model Qf into an arbitrary model, A, of CAIf , we must find a
smallest submodel, B, of A which satisfies CAI. Clearly, the basis of A, call it
x0, must be included in B, since the symbol I must refer to the same set in the
submodel as it does in the model. But, if the basis of A is in B˙ and B  CAI,
then B˙ must contain two disjoint sets of roughly the same size whose union is
the basis of A, x0. Pick such a pair, x1 and x2, to include in B˙. Whether these
are exactly the same size or differ by an atom depends on whether A  MOD2,0
or A  MOD2,1.
B must also satisfy ADIV3. We can aim for this by placing in B˙ three disjoint
sets, x11, x12, and x13 whose union is x1 and another three disjoint sets, x21,
x22, and x23 whose union is x2 . The existence of such sets is assured because
A  ADIV3. Again, the exact size relations will be determined by which MOD
principles are satisfied in A. Insuring that x1 and x2 are each divisible by 3,
also guarantees that x0 is divisible by 3: the three unions
x11 ∪ x21, x12 ∪ x22, and x13 ∪ x23
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will be roughly the same size and will exhaust x0.
We can continue this process indefinitely, dividing each set introduced at
stage n into n + 1 roughly equal subsets at stage n + 1. This will produce an
infinite tree, bearing sets. The deeper a node is in this tree, the smaller the set
it bears and the greater the number of successors among which this set will be
partitioned.
This great tree of sets will not form a boolean algebra, nor will it be closed
under finite unions. A boolean algebra could be obtained by including both the
node sets and their finite unions, but this would still not be an atomic boolean
algebra, which is what we are looking for. We cannot correct for this problem
by including in B˙ all atoms of A: A may have uncountably many atoms while B,
to be a prime model, must be countable. We leave the solution of this problem
to the formal construction.
The formal proof proceeds as follows: First, we define a tree, i.e. the set of
nodes on which we shall hang both the components of the successive partitions
described above and the atoms of the submodel being constructed. Second, we
present the construction which, given a model A of CAIf , assigns a node set
Aλ and a node atom, aλ, to each node, λ. Third, we define the shell of A as
the submodel of A generated by the collection of node sets and node atoms. In
the next section, we show that the shell of A is isomorphic to Qf .
First, the tree:
Definition 5.2.10.
a. A node is a finite sequence 〈n1, . . . , nk〉, where k > 0 and for all i ≤ k,
ni < i. (The variables λ and κ range over nodes.)
b. If λ = 〈n1, . . . , nk〉, then
(i) The length, or depth, of λ, L(λ) is k.
(ii) If 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then λ(i) = ni.
(iii) λ •m = 〈n1, . . . , nk,m〉
c. λ extends κ iff L(λ) > L(κ) and, for 1 ≤ i ≤ L(κ), λ(i) = κ(i).
d. λ 0-extends κ iff λ extends κ and, for L(κ) < i ≤ L(λ), λ(i) = 0.
Nodes constitute the vertices of an infinite tree in which 〈0〉 is the root and
λ dominates κ iff κ extends λ. The number of immediate descendants of a node
grows as the depth of the node increases.
We shall now assign a set to each node by repeatedly partitioning the basis
of A. At the same time we shall assign an atom to each node.
Definition 5.2.11. Given A = Af  CAIf , where f is a total, congruous
remainder function:
a. Let A〈0〉 be the basis of A, and let a〈0〉 be any atom of A.
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b. Suppose that Aλ and aλ have been chosen. Let m = L(λ) and let
k =
f((m+ 1)!)− f(m!)
m!
Since f is congruous, k is an integer (see Definition 3.3.7e). Let
Aλ•0, . . . ,Aλ•m
be an (m + 1, k) partition of Aλ if Aλ is common or an (m + 1, k +
1) partition of Aλ if Aλ is charmed. Fact 5.2.12 guarantees that such
partitions exist. In either case, choose Aλ•0 so that it contains aλ. This
is always possible because Aλ contains aλ.
c. Let aλ•0 = aλ. If 0 < i ≤ m, let aλ•i be any atomic subset of Aλ•i.
The sets Aλ will be referred to as node sets and the atoms aλ as node atoms.
Fact 5.2.12. Suppose A  CAIf , n > 0, m > 0, and
k =
f(nm)− f(n)
n
Then
a. x has an (m, k)-partition iff A  Modm,k(x)
b. Every common n-factor of A˙ has an (m, k)-partition.
c. Every charmed n-factor of A˙ has an (m, k + 1)-partition.
Proof.
a. Modm,k(x) says that x has an (m, k)-partition.
b. All common n-factors are the same size and satisfy the same Modm,k
predicate. So, suppose that each common n-factor has k charmed m-
factors and m− k common m-factors.
By (a), A has f(n) charmed n-factors and n − f(n) common n-factors.
Partitioning each of the n-factors into m subsets of roughly the same size
yields an nm-partition of A; the charmed m-factors of the n-factors are
the charmed nm factors of A and the common m-factors of the n-factors
are the common nm factors of A.
Each of the common n factors has k charmed m-factors and each of the
charmed n-factors has k + 1 charmed m-factors. In all, there are
(n− f(n))k + f(n)(k + 1)
=nk + f(n)
charmed m-factors among the n-factors of A.
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But, by (a) again, there are f(nm) charmed nm-factors of A. So
f(nm) = nk + f(n)
and k = (f(nm)− f(n))/n
c. Immediate from (b), since every charmed n-factor is one atom larger than
each common n-factor.
The facts listed in 5.2.13 should clarify this constuction. All of them can be
established by induction on the depth of nodes.
Fact 5.2.13.
a. Aλ ⊂ Aκ iff κ extends λ or κ = λ.
b. If Aλ = Aκ, then κ = λ.
c. There are n! nodes (and, hence, node sets) of depth n.
d. If i 6= j, then Aλ•i ∩Aλ•j = ∅.
e. Any two node sets of the same depth are disjoint.
f. Each node set is the disjoint union of its immediate descendants.
g. Each node set is the disjoint union of all of its descendants at any given
depth.
h. aλ ⊂ Aκ iff λ extends κ.
i. aλ = aκ iff one of λ and κ 0-extends the other.
j. Every node set contains infinitely many node atoms.
k. For any n, the node sets of depth n form an (n!, f(n!))-partition of the
basis of A.
Proof. We demonstrate (k) by induction on n.: If n = 1, then n! = 1, f(n!) = 0,
and Aλ〈0〉 is the basis of A. So (k) holds because any set is a (1,0)-partition of
itself.
Assume that (k) holds for n. Then (k) also holds for n+1: each node set of
depth n has n + 1 immediate descendants; so, there are (n!)(n + 1) = (n + 1)!
node sets of depth n+ 1.
Furthermore, f(n!) of the n-factors are charmed and n!−f(n!) are common.
By Fact 5.2.12, each charmed n-factor has an (n+ 1, k + 1)-partition and each
common n-factor has an (n+ 1, k)-partition, where
k =
f(n!(n+ 1))− f(n!)
n!
=
f((n+ 1)!)− f(n!)
n!
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(substituting n! for n and n+ 1 for m).
So, there are
(k + 1)f(n!) charmed n+ 1 factors from the charmed n-factors
and k(n!− f(n!)) charmed n+ 1 factors from the common n-factors
In all, then , the number of charmed n-factors is:
(k + 1)f(n!) + k(n!− f(n!))
= kf(n!) + f(n!) + n!k − f(n!)k
= f(n!) + n!k
= f(n!) + f((n!)(n+ 1))− f(n!)
= f(n!)(n+ 1))
= f((n+ 1)!)
So, the n+1 factors of the n-factors of the basis form an ((n+1)!, f((n+1)!))-
partition of the basis. That is to say, (k) holds for n+ 1.
Given a collection of node sets, Aλ, and node-atoms, aλ, from a model, A,
of CAIf , we can now construct a submodel, B, of A which is isomorphic to Qf .
Definition 5.2.14. Suppose f is total and congruous, that A  CAIf and Aλ
and aλ are the node sets and node-atoms of A produced by construction 5.1.12.
Then, the shell of A is the submodel of A generated by {Aλ, aλ}.
For the remainder of this chapter, we will regard as fixed:
a. f , a total, congruous remainder function
b. A, a model of CAIf ,
c. {Aλ, aλ}, a set of node sets and node-atoms produced by the construction
above.
d. Aˆ, the shell of A generated from {Aλ, aλ}
To show that Aˆ ≃ Qf , we need a sharper characterization of the elements
of Aˆ. Recall from 3.2.24 that each member, x, of Q has a unique representation
as
(C(x) ∪∆1(x))−∆2(x)
where C(x) is a quasi-congruence class, ∆1(x) and ∆2(x) are finite sets and
∆1(x) ∩ C(x) = ∅
∆1(x) ∩∆2(x) = ∅
∆2(x) ⊆ C(x)
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We can obtain a similar representation for elements of Aˆ: the node sets play
the role of (some of) the congruence classes; finite unions of node sets correspond
to the quasi-congruence classes; finite sets of node-atoms correspond to the finite
subsets in Q.
Definition 5.2.15.
a. x is a quasi-nodal set of A iff it is the union of finitely many node sets
(iff it is the union of finitely many node sets at a given depth).
b. x is an A-finite set iff it is a finite set of node atoms.
c. If x ∈ A and y ∈ A, then x is A-near y iff both x − y and y − x are
A-finite sets,
(cf. 3.2.14-3.2.18)
Still following in the footsteps of chapter 3, we can characterize
˙ˆA as the
collection of sets A-near quasi-nodal sets. Analogues of 3.2.15 through 3.2.18
obtain for A-nearness.
Fact 5.2.16.
a. x ∈
˙ˆ
A iff x is A-near some quasi-nodal set of A.
b. Aˆ is an atomic boolean algebra whose atoms are the node-atoms aλ.
c. If x ∈
˙ˆ
A, then x has a unique representation as
(C(x) ∪∆1(x)) −∆2(x)
where C(x) is a quasi-nodal set disjoint from ∆1(x) and including ∆2(x),
both of which are A-finite sets.
Proof.
a. (⇒)Aˆ is generated from node sets and node atoms via the boolean oper-
ations, each of which preserves A-nearness to quasi-nodal sets.
(⇐)Aˆ must contain finite unions of node sets as well as A-finite sets; so it
must also contain sets obtained by adding or removing A-finite sets from
quasi-nodal sets.
b. The proof parallels that of Theorem 3.2.21 exactly.
c. Let C(x) be the quasi-nodal set which is A-near x (see 3.2.23); Let
∆1(x) = x− C(x); and, let ∆2(x) = C(x) − x.
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5.2.3 The embeddings
To embed Qf into A, we first describe Q in terms of node sets and node atoms.
In effect, we are performing the construction 5.2.12 on Qf , but with two dif-
ferences: first, we are stipulating which (n,m)-partitions to use at each level;
second, we are selecting node atoms so that every singleton in Q is the node
atom for some node. This latter condition guarantees that the shell of Qf will
be Qf itself.
Definition 5.2.17. Suppose λ is a node. Then
a. If L(λ) = k, then
Qλ = [k!n+m]
where
m =
k∑
i=1
λ(i)(i − 1)!
b. The depth of Qλ is L(λ).
Examples.
Q〈0〉 = [n]
Q〈0,0〉 = [2n]
Q〈0,1〉 = [2n+ 1]
Q〈0,1,0〉 = [6n+ 1]
Q〈0,0,2〉 = [6n+ 4]
Q〈0,1,2〉 = [6n+ 5]
Definition 5.2.18.
a. ι(λ) = the least n ∈ Qλ.
b. qλ = {ι(λ)}
Fact 5.2.19.
a. If λ = 〈n1, . . . , nk〉, then
ι(λ) =
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)!ni
b. ι(λ) = ι(κ) iff λ = κ or one 0-extends the other.
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c. For every n, there’s a λ such that n = ι(λ).
d. For every n, there are infinitely many λ such that n = ι(λ).
e. For every n, there’s a λ such that n = ι(κ) iff κ = λ or κ 0-extends λ.
Fact 5.2.20.
a. At each depth, n, the ι(λ) take on all and only values less than n!.
b. If ι(λ) = k, then all nodes along the left-most branch descending from λ
also have the value k. These are the only nodes below λ with the value k.
c. Every natural number is the value of all and only those nodes along the
left-most branch descending from some node.
Though for a given natural number n, there will be infinitely many nodes λ
for which ι(λ) = n, we can associate with each natural number a shortest (i.e.
shallowest) node for which ι(λ) = n.
Definition 5.2.21. λn = the shortest λ such that ι(λ) = n.
Fact 5.2.22.
a. ι(λn) = n
b. λ extends λι(λ)
c. λι(λn) = λn
d. λι(λ) = λ iff λ =< 0 > or λ(L(λ)) 6= 0 (ie a node, λ, will be the highest
node with a certain value just in case λ is not the leftmost immediate
descendant of its parent.)
Each of the points listed in Fact 5.2.13 hold for the sets Qλ and qλ. That is
to say, the Qλ can be regarded as node sets and the qλ as node atoms for any
model Qf . Notice, especially, that 5.2.13k holds.
We may, finally, define the embedding of Qf into A:
Fact 5.2.23. If x ∈ Q, there is a unique y ∈
˙ˆ
A such that
∀λ(qλ ⊆ x↔ aλ ⊆ y)
Proof. There is at most one such y, by Fact 5.2.16. To show that there is such
a y, suppose first that x ∈ QC.
Then there is some n such that
x = x1 ∪ · · · ∪ xk
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where each xi is an (n!)-congruence class and hence a node set in Qf . So
x = Qλ1 ∪ · · · ∪Qλk
Now, let
y = Aλ1 ∪ · · · ∪Aλk
So y ∈
˙ˆ
A and:
qλ ⊂ x iff qλ ⊂ Qλi , for some i
iff λ extends λi by 5.2..13h
iff aλ ⊂ Aλi
iff aλ ⊂ y.
If x is not a quasi-congruence class, then
x = (x′ ∪∆1(x))−∆2(x)
where x′ is a quasi-congruence class. Let y′ be the element of
˙ˆ
A corresponding
to x′, as described above, and let
y = (y′ ∪ {aλ | qλ ⊆ ∆1(x) })− {aλ | qλ ⊆ ∆2(x) }
Definition 5.2.24. The nodal embedding of Q into A˙ is defined by letting
g(x ∈ Q) be the y ∈
˙ˆ
A such that
∀λ(aλ ⊆ y ↔ qλ ⊆ x)
Fact 5.2.25.
a. If x ∈ Q, then
g(x) = (g(C(x)) ∪ g(∆1(x))) − g(∆2(x))
b. g is one-one.
c. g maps Q onto
˙ˆ
A.
Proof.
a. Immediate from the proof of 5.2.23.
b. Suppose g(x) = y = g(x′). Then
∀λ(qλ ⊆ x↔ aλ ⊆ y ↔ qλ ⊆ x
′)
But every integer is ι(λ) for some λ, so x = x′.
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c. Obvious.
Theorem 5.2.26. The nodal embedding, g, of Q into A is an isomorphism of
Qf onto Aˆ.
Proof.
a.
Qf  x ⊆ y iff ∀λ(qλ ⊂ x→ qλ ⊂ y)
iff ∀λ(aλ ⊆ g(x)→ aλ ⊆ g(y)) (by 5.2.24)
iff Aˆ  g(x) ⊆ g(y) (by 5.2.16)
b. As in (a), g can be shown to preserve ∅, I, unions, intersections, relative
complements, and proper subsets.
c. Let nc(z, n) be the number of charmed node sets of level n contained in
C(z). And let n, below, be the least k such that x and y are both unions
of node sets of depth k.
Qf  x ∼ y iff θf (x) = θf (y)
iff nc(x, n)− (|∆1(x)| − |∆2(x)|)
= nc(y, n)− (|∆1(y)| − |∆2(y)|)
iff nc(g(x), n)− (|g(∆1(x))| − |g(∆2(x))|)
= nc(g(y), n)− (|g(∆1(y))| − |g(∆2(y))|)
since Qλ is charmed iff Aλ is charmed
and g preserves boolean relations
iff A  g(x) ∼ g(y)
iff Aˆ  g(x) ∼ g(y) since Aˆ ⊆ A
d.
Qf  x < y iff Qf  x ∼ x
′ ⊂ y
for some x′ ∈ Q since Qf  REP
<
iff A  g(x) ∼ g(x′) ⊂ g(y) by (b) and (c)
iff A  g(x) < g(y) since A  SUBSET, INDISC∼
iff Aˆ  g(x) < g(y) since Aˆ ⊆ A
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e.
Qf  Sum(x, y, z) iff Qf  (x
′ ∪ y′ = z
∧ x ∼ x′ ∧ y ∼ y′
∧ x′ ∩ y′ = ∅) since Qf  DEF
+
iff Aˆ  (g(x′) ∪ g(y′) = g(z)
∧ g(x) ∼ g(x′)
∧ g(y) ∼ g(y′)
∧ g(x′) ∩ g(y′) = ∅) by (b) and (c)
iff A  (g(x′) ∪ g(y′) = g(z)
∧ g(x) ∼ g(x′)
∧ g(y) ∼ g(y′)
∧ g(x′) ∩ g(y′) = ∅)
iff A  Sum(g(x), g(y), g(z)) since A  DEF+
iff Aˆ  Sum(g(x), g(y), g(z)) since Aˆ ⊆ A
So, each model of CAIf has a submodel isomorphic to Qf , and we may
conclude:
Corollary 5.2.27. If f is total and congruous, then CAIf has a prime model.
5.3 Summary
We can now draw our final conclusions about CA, CS, and their completions.
Theorem 5.3.1. If f is a total, congruous remainder function, then CAIf is
consistent and complete.
Proof. CAIf is consistent because f is congruous, by 3.3.12c. Since CAIf is
model complete, by 5.1.6, and has a prime model, by 5.2.27, the prime model
test (Appendix, Fact C.3) applies. So CAIf is complete.
Corollary 5.3.2. It T is a completion of CAI, then T ≡ CAIf , for some con-
gruous f .
Proof. For each n > 0, T ⊢ MODn,i for exactly one i, 0 ≤ i < n:
Since T is complete, T ⊢ MODn,i or T ⊢ ¬MODn,i for each such i. But if
T ⊢ (¬MODn,0 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬MODn,n−1), then T is inconsistent, since T ⊢ CAI and
CAI ⊢ DIVn. Hence T ⊢ MODn,i for at least one one i, 0 ≤ i < n.
But suppose T ⊢ MODn,i and T ⊢ MODn,j where 0 ≤ i 6= j < n. Again, T
would be inconsistent, for CA ⊢ MODn,i → ¬MODn,j (see Lemma 3.3.11).
So, let f(n) = m iff T ⊢ MODn,m. Then T ⊢ CAIf and, since CAIf is
complete, CAIf ⊢ T .
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Corollary 5.3.3.
a. Every completion of CA is consistent with CS.
b. CA ≡ CS
Proof.
a. Follows from 5.3.2 and 3.3.13.
b. Follows from (a) and 3.3.2b, given that CS ⊢ CA.
Theorem 5.3.4.
a. For n > 0, CS;EXACTLYn is decidable.
b. CS is decidable.
Proof.
a. CS; EXACTLYn ⊢ φ iff An  φ. But An is a finite model.
b. To determine whether CS ⊢ φ, alternate between generating theorems of
CA and testing whether An  ¬φ.
Corollary 5.3.5.
a. CSI has 2ω completions.
b. For total f , CSIf is decidable iff f is decidable.
Proof.
a. There are 2ω remainder functions whose domain is the set of prime num-
bers. Each such function is congruous, so each corresponds to a consistent
extension of CSI. By Lindenbaum’s lemma, each of these extensions has
a consistent and complete extension.
b. (⇒)If f is decidable, then CAIf is recursively enumerable. But CAIf is
complete, so it is decidable.
(⇐)To calculate f(n), determine which MODn,m sentence is in CSIf .
Theorem 5.3.6. There is no sentence, φ, such that T = CA;φ is consistent
and T has only infinite models.
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Proof. If φ is true only in infinite models of CA, then ¬φ is true in all finite
models of CA, so ¬φ ∈ CS. But CA ≡ CS, so CA;φ is inconsistent.
Theorem 5.3.7. CS is not finitely axiomatizable.
Proof. Suppose CS ⊢ φ. So CA ⊢ φ and, by compactness, (BASIC ∪ T ) ⊢ φ
for some finite set of ADIVn principles, T = {ADIVn | n ∈ J }. Let K =
{n | every prime factor of n is a member of J }.
Let A be a model with domain
⋃
k∈K Qk, in which size relations are deter-
mined in accordance with the size function, θ, defined in 3.2.26. We claim the
following without proof:
A  BASIC(1)
A  ADIVj for all j ∈ J(2)
A 2 ADIVk(3)
By (1) and (2), A  (BASIC ∪ T ), so A  φ. But by (3), A 2 CS. Hence
φ 0 CS.
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6Sets of Natural Numbers
CS has standard finite models since it consists of sentences true in all such
models. It has infinite models Qn and Qf . In this chapter we will show that
CS has infinite standard models over P(N).
An ordering of P(N) that satisfies CS will not necessarily appear reasonable.
For example, some such orderings say that there are fewer even numbers than
prime numbers (see below 6.2.13). To rule out such anomalies, we introduce
a principle, OUTPACING, in section 1. OUTPACING mentions the natural
ordering of N and applies only to subsets of N. Section 2 establishes that
OUTPACING can be satisfied jointly with any consistent extension of CS in
a model whose domain is P(N). So CS ; OUTPACING does not fix the size
relations over P(N).
6.1 The outpacing principle
Throughout this chapter, x and y will range over P(N).
Definition 6.1.1. x outpaces y just in case the restriction of x to any suffi-
ciently large initial segment of N is larger than the corresponding restriction of
y, that is, iff:
∃n∀m(m > n→ |x[m]| > |y[m]|)
Notice that the size comparison between the two restricted sets will always
agree with the comparison of their normal cardinalities since all initial segments
of N are finite.
We employ this notion to state a sufficient condition for one set of natural
numbers to be larger than another:
OUTPACING. If x outpaces y, then x ¿ y.
The general motivation behind this principle should be familiar. We extrapolate
from well understood finite cases to puzzling infinite cases. But we should also
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emphasize, again, that this extrapolation cannot be done in any straightfor-
ward, mechanical way without risking contradiction. We cannot, for example,
strengthen the conditional to a biconditional, thus:
(1) x ¿ y iff x outpaces y.
This revised principle conflicts with CS, for outpacing is not a quasi-linear or-
dering. For example, neither [2n] nor [2n+ 1] outpaces the other since each
initial segment {0, . . . , 2n+ 1} of N contains n evens and n odds. But the two
are discernible under outpacing, since [2n] outpaces [2n+ 2] while [2n+ 1] does
not.
There is another point that underlines the need for care in extrapolating
from finite cases to infinite cases: we cannot just use (2):
(2) If, given any finite subset z of N, x restricted to z is larger
than y restricted to z, then x > y.
Though (2) is true, its antecedent is only satisfied when y ⊂ x.
So, there are many statements that assert of infinite cases what is true of
finite cases. Some of these conflict with one another. Others are too weak to
be helpful. It is doubtful whether there is any mechanical way to decide which
of these statements are true. The best we can do is propose plausible theories,
determine whether they are consistent, and see how far they go.
Definition 6.1.0. A is an outpacing model iff
A˙ = P(N)
A  BASIC, and
A  OUTPACING
There is a slight difficulty in saying that an interpretation of LC< satisfies
OUTPACING . Since OUTPACING involves the ¡ relation over N, it cannot be
expressed in LC<. We shall finesse this problem by regarding OUTPACING as
the (very large) set of sentences
{b < a | a outpaces b }
Fact 6.1.1. Every outpacing model satisfies the following
a. [2n] > [3n]
b. [3n] > [4n] > [5n] > . . .
c. If k > 0, then [kn] >
[
n2
]
Proof.
a. [2n] has at least (k−1)/2 members less than or equal to k for any given k.
[3n] has at most k/3+1 such members. If k > 4, then (k−1)/2 > k/3+1
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b. Similar to (1).
c. If m = k2, both [kn] and
[
n2
]
have exactly k members less than m. For
m > k(k + 1), N[m] will have more members in [kn] than in
[
n2
]
.
Fact 6.1.2. Every outpacing model satisfies the following
a. [2n] ≥ [2n+ 1]
b. [2n+ 1] ≥ [2n+ 2]
c. If [2n] > [2n+ 1], then [2n+ 1] ∼ [2n+ 2].
Proof.
a. By TRICH, it is sufficient to show that ¬ [2n] < [2n+ 1]. If it were, then,
by REP<, there is a y such that y ∼ [2n] and y ⊂ [2n+ 1]. But any
proper subset of [2n+ 1] is outpaced by, and hence smaller than [2n]. Let
k be the least odd number not in y. Then [2n] leads y at k+1 and y never
catches up. So there is no y such that [2n] ∼ y ⊂ [2n+ 1].
b. Similar to that of (1).
c. Note that [2n] = [2n+ 2] ∪ {0} and that BASIC  (*).
(y ⊂ x ∧ z ≤ y ∧ Atom(z′) ∧ z ⊂ x ∧ x = z ∪ z′)→ y ∼ z
Let x = [2n], y = [2n+ 1], z = [2n+ 2] and apply (*).
The two alternatives left open in 6.1.2 correspond to the possibilities that N
may be odd or even: if [2n] ∼ [2n+ 1], then N is even, if [2n+ 1] ∼ [2n+ 2],
then N is odd. In section 6.2, we show that both of these possibilities can be
realized in standard models over P(N). Here, we generalize 6.1.2 to similar
cases, including other congruence classes.
Definition 6.1.3. 〈x, y〉 is an alternating pair iff x and y are infinite and
for all i > 0, xi < yi < xi+1.
Fact 6.1.4. If 〈x, y〉 is an alternating pair, then in any outpacing model:
x ∼ y ∨ x > y ∼ (x− x1)
Proof. The argument for 6.1.2 applies here since the only facts about [2n] and
[2n+ 1] used hold by virtue of these sets forming an alternating pair.
Theorem 6.1.5. For a given k > 0, let Ai = [kn+ i] for each i < k. Then:
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a. If 0 ≤ i < j < k, then 〈Ai, Aj〉 is an alternating pair.
b. There is a p, 0 < p ≤ k such that
(i) If i < j < p, then Ai ∼ Aj .
(ii) If p 6= k, then A0 ∼ Ap ∪ {0}.
(iii) If p ≤ i < k, then Ai ∼ Ap.
(See example below).
Proof.
a. Ai(n) = kn+ i,Aj(n) = kn+ j, Ai(n+ 1) = kn+ i+ k and i < j < k+ i.
b. If A0 > Ai for some i, let p be the least such i; otherwise, let p = k.
(i) For 0 ≤ i < p, 〈A0, Ai〉 is an alternating pair. So either A0 > Ai or
A0 ∼ Ai by 6.1.4. But A0 ≤ Ai by the selection of p, so A0 ∼ Ai. (i)
follows by TRANS∼.
(ii) Immediate from 6.1.4 since 〈A0, Ap〉 is an alternating pair and A0 >
Ap.
(iii) A0 > Ap ≥ Ai if i ≥ p. So A0 > Ai. Hence Ai ∼ A0 − {0} ∼ Ap. So
Ai ∼ Ap.
Example. Let k = 4, so Ai = [4n+ i] for i = 0, 1, 2, 3. Then one of the
following situations obtains:
A0 ∼ A1 ∼ A2 ∼ A3 > [4n+ 4]
A0 > A1 ∼ A2 ∼ A3 ∼ [4n+ 4]
A0 ∼ A1 > A2 ∼ A3 ∼ [4n+ 4]
A0 ∼ A1 ∼ A2 > A3 ∼ [4n+ 4]
6.2 Models of CS and Outpacing
In this section, we construct models of CS over P(N) that satisfy OUTPACING.
Outpacing models will be constructed out of finite models of CS by a tech-
nique which is very much like the ultraproduct construction common in model
theory, though the application here demands some important differences.
Definition 6.2.1.
a. LN , the language of subsets of N, is the first order language which
results from adding to LC<, as individual constants, a name for each subset
of N.
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b. An is the standard finite interpretation of LN over P(N[n]) in which:
An(a) = a ∩ N
[n] = a[n] for each a ⊆ N.
Definition 6.2.2. (cf. [Monk, Def. 18.15, p318] If X is a set and F ⊆ P(X),
then
a. F has the finite intersection property iff the intersection of any finite
subset of F is non-empty.
b. F is a filter over X iff
(i) F 6= ∅
(ii) If a ∈ F and a ⊆ b, then b ∈ F , and
(iii) If a ∈ F and b ∈ F , then a ∩ b ∈ F
c. F is an ultrafilter over X iff
(i) F is a filter over X
(ii) X ∈ F , and
(iii) if Y ⊆ X, then either Y ∈ F or (X − Y ) ∈ F .
d. An ultrafilter, F , over X is principal iff there is some x ∈ F such that
F = { a ⊆ X | x ∈ a }
Fact 6.2.3.
a. A non-principal ultrafilter contains no finite sets. [Bell, Ch.6, lemma 1.3,
p.108]
b. A non-principal ultrafilter over X contains all cofinite subsets of X.
c. If F ⊆ P(X) and F has the finite intersection property, then there is an
ultrafilter over X which includes F . [Monk, Prop. 18.18, p.319]
d. If Y ⊆ X and Y is infinite, then there is a non-principal ultrafilter over
X which contains Y .
Definition 6.2.4. If F is an ultrafilter over N, then AF is the interpretation
of LC< in which
a. A˙F = P(N),
b. AF  a < b iff
{
k | a[k] < b[k]
}
∈ F , and similarly for other predicates.
c. Boolean symbols receive the usual interpretation.
Our main result is that if F is non-principal, then AF is an outpacing model.
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Theorem 6.2.5. If F is a non-principal ultrafilter over N, then
a. If τ is a term of LN , then
Ak(τ) = AF (τ) ∩ Ak = AF (τ)
[k]
b. If φ is a quantifier free formula of LN , then
AF  φ iff { k | Ak  φ } ∈ F
c. If φ is a universal formula of LN and Ak  φ for every k, then AF  φ.
d. AF  REP
<.
e. AF  BASIC.
f. AF  ADIVn, for every n.
Proof.
a. By induction on the structure of τ :
(i) If τ is a constant, τ = a for some a ⊂ N. So Ak(τ) = a[n] by 6.2.1b.
(ii) If τ = pτ1 ∪ τ2q,
Ak(τ) = Ak(τ1) ∪ Ak(τ2)
= (AF (τ1) ∩ Ak) ∪ (AF (τ2) ∩Ak)
= (AF (τ1) ∪ AF (τ2)) ∩ Ak
= AF (τ1 ∪ τ2) ∩ Ak
The proofs for intersections and relative complements are similar.
b. By induction on the structure of φ:
(i) If φ = pa ⊂ bq, then AF  φ iff a ⊂ b
If a ⊂ b, then there is a k ∈ b but not ∈ a. So if n > k, a[n] ⊂ b[n].
Hence, {n | AF  φ } is cofinite and, by 4.2.3b, in F .
Conversely, if
{
n | a[n] ⊂ b[n]
}
∈ F , then it is infinite. So, there
cannot be a k in a but not in b; otherwise a[n] would not be included
in b[n] for any n greater than k. So a ⊆ b. But, clearly a 6= b, so
a ⊂ b.
(ii) If φ = pa = bq, then
AF  φ iff a = b
iff a[n] = b[n] for all n.
iff {n | An  a = b } = N
iff {n | An  a = b } ∈ F
since if An 2 a = b and k > n, then Ak 2 a = b.
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(iii) AF  a < b iff { k | Ak  (a < b) } ∈ F . Immediate from 6.2.4b.
(iv) If φ is non-atomic, then, since F is an ultrafilter:
AF  φ1 ∧ φ2 iff AF  φ1 and AF  φ2
iff { k | Ak  φ1 } ∈ F and { k | Ak  φ2 } ∈ F
iff { k | Ak  φ1 ∧ φ2 } ∈ F
AF  ¬φ iff AF 2 φ
iff { k | Ak  φ } /∈ F
iff { k | Ak  ¬φ } ∈ F
c.
Suppose Ak  ∀xφ(x), for all k
then Ak  φ(a), for all a, for all k
So Ak  φ(a), for all k, for all a
So AF  φ(a), for all a by (b)
So AF  ∀xφ(x)
d. SupposeAF  (a < b). Construct a′, a subset of b, for whichAF  (a ∼ a′)
as follows:
Let K =
{
k | a[k] < b[k]
}
so, K ∈ F .
= {k1, . . . , ki, . . .} where the ki’s are in strictly increasing order.
Let a0 = ∅
ai+1 = ai ∪
{
the n greatest members of b[ki+1] not in ai
}
,
where n = |a[ki+1]| − |ai|
a′ =
⋃
ai
Then a′ ⊂ b since each ai draws its new members from b.
Claim: If k ∈ K, then a′[k] ∼ a[k].
Hence: AF  a′ ∼ a since they are the same size over some set which
contains K and is, thus, if F .
e. Immediate from (c) and (d): BASIC is equivalent to a set of universal
sentences, together with ATOM and REP<. (AF  ATOM because it
contains all singletons of natural numbers.)
f. For 0 < i ≤ n, x an infinite subset of N, let xi = {xkn+i−1 | k ∈ N }.
The n sets, xi, partition x. Furthermore, these form an alternating n-
tuple, in the manner of the congruence classes modulo n (see Theorem
6.1.5). As in 6.1.5, these sets are approximately equal in size and AF 
ADIVn(x).
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Corollary 6.2.6. If F is a non-principal ultrafilter over N, then
a. AF  CAI, and
b. AF  CSI
Proof.
a. Immediate from 6.2.5e and 6.2.5f.
b. Immediate from (a) and 5.3.3b.
The proof of 6.2.6 is modeled on the usual ultraproduct construction, but
is not quite the same. In the usual construction(see, for example, [Bell, pp.
87-92]), a model is built by first taking the product of all factors (in this case,
the Ak), which results in a domain whose elements are functions from the index
set (N, here) to elements of the factors. These functions are then gathered
into equivalence classes (by virtue of agreeing almost everywhere, i.e. on some
member of the filter) and the reduced ultraproduct is defined by interpreting
the language over these equivalence classes. The model so constructed, which
we’ll call
∏
Ai/F , has the handy property that it satisfies any formula which is
satisfied by almost all factors, and certainly any formula which is satisfied in all
the factors. This is handy because, given that each of the Ak satisfies CS, we
can immediately conclude that
∏
Ai/F satisfies CS.
Unfortunately,
∏
Ai/F is not the model we wanted: its elements are not
subsets of N, but equivalence classes of functions from N to finite subsets of
N. There is, indeed, a natural mapping from subsets of N to such elements,
and this mapping would have allowed us to identify a model over P(N) as a
submodel of
∏
Ai/F ; but only a submodel. So, had we constructed the reduced
ultraproduct, we would have then been able to infer that the part of that model
which held our interest satisfied all universal formulas of CS; we still would
have had to resort to special means to show that the non-universal formulas
were likewise satisfied.
Fortunately, these special means were available; the only non-universal ax-
ioms of CAI could be verified in the constructed model more or less directly, and
the completeness proof of the last chapter allowed us to infer that all formulas
true in all of the factors are true in the model AF , after all.
For a given F , there will be many cases where AF  a < b even though
b does not outpace a. This will happen whenever
{
k | a[k] < b[k]
}
∈ F but is
not cofinite. Consider a familiar example: Let a = [2n+ 1] and b = [2n]. Then
a[k] < b[k] iff k ∈ [2n], for if we count the even numbers and the odd numbers
up to some even number, there will always be one more even and if we count up
to some odd number, there will always be the same number of evens and odds.
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[2n] is neither finite nor cofinite, so it may or may not be in F , If [2n] ∈ F ,
AF  [2n+ 1] < [2n]. Otherwise, [2n+ 1] ∈ F , so AF  [2n+ 1] ∼ [2n].
The construction of a model AF from any non-principal ultrafilter, F , sug-
gests that there are many outpacing models unless different ultrafilters can yield
the same model. We will first show that this qualification is not needed.
Theorem 6.2.7. If F1 and F2 are distinct non-principal ultrafilters over N,
then AF1 6= AF2 .
Proof. (See below.)
To show this, we will show that the presence of a set in an ultrafilter makes a
direct, personalized contribution to the model AF . Putting this in another way,
there is a set of decisions that must be made in constructing an outpacing model;
each decision may go either way, though the decisions are not independent of
each other. Furthermore, each decision is made for a model AF by the presence
or absence of a particular set in F .
Definition 6.2.8. If x ⊆ N, then x+ = { i+ 1 | i ∈ x }.
A pair of sets, 〈x, x+〉, can sometimes be an alternating pair, but this is not
always the case.
Fact 6.2.9. 〈x, x+〉 is an alternating pair iff x is infinite and there is no n ∈ x
such that (n+ 1) ∈ x. That is, no two consecutive numbers are in x.
Nevertheless, pairs 〈x, x+〉 are like alternating pairs in the following way:
Lemma 6.2.10. If x is infinite, x1 = (x − x+), x2 = (x+ − x), F is a non-
principal ultrafilter, and A = AF , then
a. 〈x1, x2〉 is an alternating pair.
b. A  x ∼ x+ or A  x > x+ ∼ x− {x1}
c. A  x > x+ iff x ∈ F .
Proof.
a. Let a run of x be a maximal consecutive subset of x. (So [2n] has only 1-
membered runs, while N−[10n+ 1] has only 9-membered runs.) So, x1(n)
is the first element in the n-th run of x and x2(n) is the first element after
the n-th run of x.
b. We know from (a) that x2 ∼ x1 or x2 ∼ x1−x1(1). But the disjoint union
of x ∩ x+ with x1 or x2, respectively, yields x or x+. So (b) follows from
DISJ∪.
c. We need only prove (*):
|x[n]| > |x+
[n]
| iff n ∈ x(*)
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Informally: x[n] first becomes greater than x+
[n]
for n = x(1), since x(1) /∈
x+ because ¬(x1−x1(1) ⊂ x). Throughout the first run of x, x maintains
its lead, losing it only at the least n for which n /∈ x (since (n− 1) ∈ x, so
n ∈ x+). This pattern repeats during successive runs of x.
We can now prove our main result, Theorem 6.2.7:
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can suppose there is a set, x, such that
x ∈ F1 and x /∈ F2. By 6.2.10c, AF1  x > x
+ and AF2  x ∼ x
+
Theorem 6.2.7 allows us to improve upon some previous results. For example,
we can show that either of the alternatives in 6.2.10b can obtained for any
alternating pair.
Theorem 6.2.11.
a. If neither x nor y outpaces the other, then there is an ultrafilter F , such
that AF  (x ∼ y).
b. If 〈x, y〉 is an alternating pair, then there is an ultrafilter F , such that
AF  (x > y).
Proof.
a. Let J =
{
k | |x[k]| = |y[k]|
}
. Since neither x nor y outpaces the other, J
is infinite. By 6.2.3d, let F be a non-principal ultrafilter which contains
J . Then AF  x ∼ y.
b. If 〈x, y〉 is an alternating pair, so is 〈y, x− x(1)〉. So, by (a) there is an F
such that AF  y ∼ (x− x(1). But then AF  x > y.
Theorem 6.2.12. Every infinite completion of CS has an outpacing model.
Proof. Recall that every infinite completion of CS is equivalent to CSIf for some
total and congruous remainder function, f . (See 3.6.2.)
Given such an f , let Gk = [kn+ f(k) + 1] for each k > 0. Then (*) holds
for each k:
Gk =
{
n | An  MODk,f(k)
}
(*)
Let G = {Gk | k > 0 }.
The intersection of any finite subset, H , of G is infinite. If H is a finite
subset of G, then H = {Gk | k ∈ J }, where J is some finite subset of N+. So
H = {n+ 1 | k ∈ J → n ≡ f(k) mod k }. But f is congruous, so the restriction
of f to the finite domain J has infinitely many solutions (see 3.3.8a).
Since the intersection of any finite subset of G is infinite, there is a non-
principal ultrafilter F such that G ⊆ F . By (*), AF  MODk,f(k), so AF 
CSIf .
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On the basis of 6.2.11 we noted that there are even and odd outpacing
models; we can now extend that observation to moduli other than 2. More
specifically, all of the possibilities listed in 6.1.5 for the relative sizes of the
k-congruence classes are obtainable in outpacing models.
This section has explored the existence and variety of outpacing models.
Three comments are in order before we turn to the common structure of out-
pacing models.
First, even it T is an infinite completion of CS, there is no unique outpacing
model which satisfies T . This would be true only if fixing the congruence classes
determined whether x ∼ x+ or x > x+ for every x ⊆ N . That all such choices
are not determined by a remainder theory can be seen intuitively, perhaps, by
considering x =
[
n2
]
: any finite set of congruences has infinitely many solutions
that are squares and infinitely many that are not; so whether x ∈ F is an
independent choice. Also, there are only 2ω remainder functions while there are
22
ω
non-principal ultrafilters over N[Bell, Ch. 6, Theorem 1.5], each yielding a
different outpacing model.
Second, it is not clear whether every outpacing model can be obtained by the
construction of 6.2.4. Lemma 6.2.10c may suggest that any outpacing model,
A, is AF for FA = { x | A  x > x+ }, but it should not. To establish that A =
AF , both (1) and (2) are necessary.
(1) If A is an outpacing model, then FA is a non-principal ultra-
filter.
(2) If FA = FB, then A = B
I have not been able to prove (1) or (2). If (1) is false, then clearly A 6= AF .
But even if (1) is true, two outpacing models may agree about all pairs 〈x, x+〉
but disagree elsewhere. At most one of them is obtainable by our construction.
So (1) and (2) are open problems.
Finally, though it may be extraneous to show that OUTPACING is inde-
pendent, we will do so.
Theorem 6.2.13. There are standard models of CS over P(N) which do not
satisfy OUTPACING.
Proof. Suppose that ⋖ is a linear ordering under which N forms an ω-sequence.
Then we could define x ⋖-outpaces y as follows:
∃n∀m[n⋖m→ |{ k | k ∈ x ∧ k ⋖m } | > | { k | k ∈ x ∧ k ⋖ n } |]
and define the principle:
OUTPACING⋖ . If x⋖ -outpaces y, then x > y.
Modifying 6.2.4, we could produce standard models of CS over P(N) which
satisfy OUTPACING⋖ and these will not, in general, satisfy OUTPACING.
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Suppose, for example, that ⋖ is the ordering:
p1, q1, . . . , pk, qk, . . .
where p is the set of prime numbers and q is its complement. In any model
of OUTPACING⋖ , p and q will be nearly the same size, as the evens and the
odds are in normal outpacing models. But the evens are much smaller than q,
so p > [2n] and OUTPACING is false in OUTPACING⋖ models.
6.3 Size and density
When number theorists talk about the sizes of sets of natural numbers, they do
not content themselves with speaking of the (Cantorian) cardinalities of these
sets. Since they often want to compare infinite subsets of N, they need a more
discriminating notion.
One notion they use is asymptotic density. The asymptotic density of a
set, x, of natural numbers is the limit, if there is one, of |x[n]| as n grows. For
example, the asymptotic density of [2n] is 1/2. From now on we shall use the
term ‘density’ for asymptotic density.
In this section, we compare the ordering of P(N) given by density to the
orderings given by CS and OUTPACING.
Definition 6.3.1.
a. xˆi = |x
[i]|
i
, the fraction of numbers less than or equal to i that are members
of x.
b. If x ⊆ y 6= ∅, then ρ(x, y), the density of x in y, is the limit, if it exists
of
ω
lim
i=y1
xˆi/yˆi
That is,
ρ(x, y) = r iff ∀(δ > 0)∃n(∀i > n)(r − δ <
xˆi
yˆi
< r + δ)))
c. The density of x, ρ(x), is the density of of x in N, if x has a density in
N.
d. If x ⊆ y 6= ∅, then x converges in y, cvg(x, y), iff x has a density in y;
otherwise, x diverges in y.
e. x converges, cvg(x), iff x converges in N. x diverges iff x diverges in
N.
Fact 6.3.2.
6.3. SIZE AND DENSITY 95
a. If x is finite, ρ(x) = 0.
b. If x is cofinite, ρ(x) = 1.
c.
ρ([2n]) = 1/2
ρ([4n] , [2n]) = 1/2
ρ([4n]) = 1/4
d. If cvg(x, y) and cvg(y, z), then cvg(x, z) and ρ(x, z) = ρ(x, y)ρ(y, z).
Fact 6.3.3.
a. There are divergent sets.
b. If 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, there is a set with density r.
c. If 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 and y is infinite, there is a set with density r in y.
Proof.
a. Let x =
{
i | ∃n(102n ≤ i < 102n+1
}
. So x contains all numbers between
0 and 9, between 100 and 999, between 10,000 and 99,999, and so forth.
If n > 1, then xˆ10
2n
≤ .1 and xˆ10
2n+1
≥ .9. So xˆk cannot have a limit.
b. Suppose r is given. Construct the set x as follows:
x0 = ∅
xi+1 =
{
xi, if xˆ
i ≥ r;
xi; i+ 1, otherwise.
x =
⋃
xi
c. Modify the construction for (b) in the obvious ways.
Theorem 6.3.4. Suppose that both x and y converge in z. Then, if ρ(x, z) <
ρ(y, z), y outpaces x.
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Proof.
Let b = (ρ(y, z)− ρ(x, z))/3
Let n1 = the least n such that for i ¿ n, − b < xˆ
i/zˆi − ρ(x, z) < b
and let n2 = the least n such that for i ¿ n, − b < yˆ
i/zˆi − ρ(y, z) < b
So for any i > n1 + n2,
we have xˆi/zˆi < ρ(x, z) + b
and yˆi/zˆi > ρ(y, z)− b
But ρ(x, z) + b < ρ(y, z)− b,
So xˆi/zˆi < yˆi/zˆi
So xˆi < yˆi
So |x[i]| < |y[i]|
We can use the relation between density and outpacing to draw conclusions
about densities that have nothing to do with outpacing, as in Theorem 6.3.5.
Theorem 6.3.5. If ρ(x, z1) < ρ(y, z1), and both x and y converge in z2, then
ρ(x, z2) ≤ ρ(y, z2)
Proof. Since ρ(x, z1) < ρ(y, z1), y outpaces x. But if ρ(x, z2) > ρ(y, z2), then x
outpaces y. So, ρ(x, z2) ≤ ρ(y, z2).
We cannot strengthen the consequent of 6.3.5 to say that ρ(x, z2) < ρ(y, z2):
Let z1 be the set of primes, let x contain every third member of z1, and let y
be z1 − x. Then ρ(x, z1) = 1/3 and ρ(y, z1) = 2/3, but ρ(x,N) = ρ(y,N) = 0.
Theorem 6.3.4 implies that in any outpacing model, sets with distinct den-
sities will have distinct sizes. Even if two sets have the same density, they will
differ in size if they have the same density in some common set. So, from Facts
6.3.b and (c), we can begin to appreciate how precise an ordering outpacing
models provide:
Fact 6.3.6. If A is an outpacing model, then
a. there are uncountably many sizes of sets in A, and
b. if 0 ≤ r ≤ 1, then even among sets with density r, there are uncountably
many sizes in A.
Proof.
a. Immediate from Fact 6.3.3b and Theorem 6.3.4.
b. Let x be an infinite set with density r, let y be an infinite subset of x,
where ρ(y, x) = 0, and let z = x−y. There are uncountably many subsets
of y with distinct densities in y, though ρ(y1, x) = 0, for any y1 ⊂ y.
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Suppose now that y1 ⊂ y, y2 ⊂ y, and ρ(y1) < ρ(y2). Then A  y1 < y2,
by 6.3.4. so A  z ∪ y1 < z ∪ y2, by DISJ∪.
But ρ(z ∪ y1) = ρ(z ∪ y2) = ρ(x), since z was obtained by removing from
x a set with density 0 relative to x.
6.3.1 The Convexity Problem
It’s tempting to infer from these results that the extremely fine ordering of sets
by size (or, rather, any such ordering which is realized in an outpacing model)
is both a refinement and a completion of the ordering suggested by density: a
refinement because it preserves all differences in size which are captured by the
notion of density, a completion because all sets are located in a single, linear
ordering of sizes.
But the situation is really not so clear. It is evident that the size ordering
over P(N) in any outpacing is a refinement of the ordering by cardinality: if
x has a smaller cardinal number than y, then x is smaller than y, though two
sets with the same cardinal number may have different sizes. We can regard
the cardinality of a set in P(N) as determined by its size, though different sizes
may yield the same cardinal number. We shall express this fact by saying that,
at least when we focus on P(N), cardinality is a function of size. (It is not at
all clear that this is true in any power set.)
Now, we want to know whether the density of a set is a function of its
size. It turns out that a negative answer is compatible with our theory (CS
and OUTPACING), while an affirmative answer may or may not be consistent.
First, we will give a more precise formulation of this problem; second, we will
show that a negative answer is consistent; finally, we’ll discuss the consistency of
an affirmative answer. In passing, we’ll explain why this is called the convexity
problem.
Consider (1) and (1a):
(1) If x ∼ y and ρ(x) = r, then ρ(y) = r.
(1a) If x ∼ y and ρ(x) = r and cvg(y), then ρ(y) = r.
(1a) is an immediate consequence of Theorem 6.3.4. For if y converges, there is
some r2 = ρ(y); if r < r2, then x < y and if r > r2, then x > y. But x ∼ y, so
r2 = r.
So, the questionable part of (1) can be expressed as (2):
(2) If x ∼ y and x converges, then y converges.
Theorem 6.3.4 insures that (1) just in case (2). Recalling that sets may have the
same density even though they differ in size, we may consider two additional
formulations:
(3) If ρ(x) = ρ(y) and x < z < y, then ρ(z) = ρ(x)
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(4) If ρ(x) = ρ(y) and x < z < y, then z converges.
(3) and (4) are equivalent for the same reasons that (1) and (2) are equivalent.
Fact 6.3.7. An outpacing model satisfies (1) iff it satisfies (3).
Proof.
⇒ Suppose that x < y < z and ρ(x) = ρ(z).
By REP<, there are two sets, x′ and y′, for which
x′ ⊂ y′ ⊂ z, x ∼ x′, y ∼ y′.
Since x ∼ x′
and ρ(x) = ρ(z)
then ρ(x′) = ρ(z) by (1)
So ρ(z − x′) = 0
and ρ(z − y′) = 0
But y′ = z − (z − y′)
So ρ(y′) = ρ(z)
So ρ(y) = ρ(z) by (1)
⇐ Suppose that x ∼ y and ρ(x) = r.
If x = ∅ or x = N, then y = x, so ρ(y) = ρ(x)
To apply (3), we need to find two sets, x1 and x2 such that
ρ(x1) = ρ(x2) = r = ρ(x)
and
x1 < y < x2
Assuming that x 6= ∅ and x 6= N, let
x1 = x− a, for some a ∈ x
and
x2 = x ∪ b, for some b /∈ x.
Then x1 < x < x2, by SUBSET, and x1 < y < x2, by INDISC
∼.
Since adding or removing a single element has no effect on the density of
a set,
ρ(x1) = ρ(x) = ρ(x2)
So, by (3), ρ(y) = r.
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The question at hand is called the ‘convexity problem’ because of the for-
mulation in (3). In geometry, a figure is convex if, given any two points in the
figure, any point between them (ie on the line segment from one to the other) is
also in the figure. Applying this notion in the obvious way to the size ordering,
(3) says that the class of sets having a given density is convex. By theorems
6.3.4 and 6.3.7, (1), (2) and (4) say the same thing.
We regret that the only thing we know about (3) is that it may be false:
Theorem 6.3.8. The negation of (1) is satisfied in some outpacing model.
Proof. Let x be a set with density r and let y be a divergent set which neither
outpaces nor is outpaced by x. Let K be{
n | x[n] = y[n]
}
K is infinite, soK is a member of some non-principal ultrafilter, F . AF  x ∼ y,
so (1) is false in AF .
Open Problem: Is (1) consistent with CS and OUTPACING?
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Appendix
A Notation
A.1 Predicate Logic
The formal theories discussed in this thesis are theories with standard formal-
ization, in the sense of [Tarski, p.5]. That is, they are formalized in first order
predicate logic with identity and function symbols. The following notation is
used for the predicate calculus:
∧ and
∨ or
¬ not
→ if ... then
↔ if and only if
= identical
6= not identical
∃x there is an x
∀x for all x
Conjunctions and disjunctions of sets of sentences are represented by:∧
... φ ...
φ
and ∨
... φ ...
φ
A first order language is determined by its non-logical constant symbols,
in the usual way. These may be predicates, individual constants, or function
symbols. In most cases, the ranks of the symbols will accord with their familiar
uses and we do not stipulate them.
A schematic function is a function whose range is a set of formulae. DIVn,
for example, maps natural numbers into sentences (see 3.2.8). The arguments
of such functions are indicated by subscripts.
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A.2 Set Theory
For first order languages with boolean operations and predicates, we use the
following notation:
I the universe
∅ the empty set
x ∪ y the union of x and y
x ∩ y the intersection of x and y
x− y the relative complement of y in x
x ⊆ y x is contained in y
x ⊂ y x is a proper subset of y
These symbols are also used for set theoretic relations, outside of first order
languages.
In addition, we use the following:
x ∈ y x is a member of y
P(x) the power set of x
{x | φ(x) } the set of x’s which are φ
x; a the union of x and a
x[n] the members of x less than or equal to n
N the set of natural numbers: 0, 1, ...
N+ N− 0
Z the set of integers
ω the smallest infinite cardinal
2ω 2 to the ω
A.3 Arithmetic
For arithmetic, we use the following:
i+ j i plus j
i− j i minus j
ij i times j
ij i to the j-th power
i! i factorial
i | j i divides j
gcd(i, j) greatest common divisor of i and j
n ≡ m mod j n is congruent to m modulo j
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We use the following notation for sets of natural numbers:
[...n...] = { k | ∃n(k = ...n...) }
For example:
[kn+ j] = the set of numbers congruent to j modulo k[
n2
]
= the set of squares of natural numbers
B Model Theory
This section lists the model-theoretic notions and results assumed in the text
and presents our notation for these notions.
An interpretation, A, of a first order language, L, consists of a domain, A˙,
and a function which assigns to each individual constant of L a member of A˙,
to each n-place predicate of L, a set of n-tuples over A˙, and to each n-argument
function symbol of L, an n-ary function defined over and yielding values in A˙.
We assume the notion of satisfaction as defined in [Chang, section 1.3] and
use
A  φ to mean that A satisfies φ .
Definition B.1. Familiar notions about models.
a. A is a submodel of B (A ⊆ B).
b. B is an extension of A (A ⊆ B).
c. The submodel of B generated by X, where X is a subset of B˙.
d. A is isomorphic to B (A ≃ B).
e. f is an isomorphic embedding of A into B.
f. B is an elementary extension of A.
g. {Ai} is a chain of models.
h. A =
⋃
{Ai}; the union of a chain of models.
Definition B.2. Notions about theories:
a. A theory is a set of first-order sentences.
b. The language of a theory, LT .
c. T proves φ (T ⊢ φ);
T proves T2 (T ⊢ T2).
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d. T is complete.
e. T is consistent.
f. T is categorical.
g. T is equivalent to T2 (T ≡ T2).
Fact B.3. The following are well known facts:
a. If T ⊢ φ, then some finite subset of T proves φ (compactness).
b. If T is complete and T ;φ is consistent, then T ⊢ φ.
c. If T is categorical, then T is complete.
Definition B.4. More familiar notions:
a. T is existential iff it is equivalent to a set of prenex sentences, none of
which have universal quantifiers.
b. T is universal iff it is equivalent to a set of prenex sentences, none of
which have existential quantifiers.
c. T is universal-existential iff it is equivalent to a set of prenex sen-
tences, each of which has all of its universal quantifiers preceding any of
its existential quantifiers.
d. φ is a primitive formula iff φ is an existential formula in prenex form
whose matrix is a conjunction of atomic formulas and negations of atomic
formulas.
Fact B.5. Fairly familiar facts:
a. If T is existential, A  T , and A ⊆ B, then B  T .
b. If T is universal and A  T , then any submodel of A also satisfies T .
c. If T is universal-existential and Ai  T , for all i > 0, then
⋃
{Ai}  T .
C Model Completeness
This section presents the definition ofmodel completeness and some basic results
needed in Chapters 4 and 5.
There are several ways to show that a theory is complete. We use only one,
which is based on A. Robinson’s notion of model completeness.
Definition C.1. T is model complete iff T is consistent and for any two
models, A and B of T , A ⊆ B iff A is an elementary submodel of B. [Monk, p.
355].
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A model complete theory is not necessarily complete, unless the theory has
a prime model.
Definition C.2. A is a prime model of T if A  T and A can be embedded
in any model of T . [Monk, p.359]
Fact C.3. If T is model complete and T has a prime model, then T is complete.
To show that a theory is model complete we rely, directly or indirectly, on a
theorem of Monk’s (see 4.2.1a), which is based on some equivalent formulations
of model completeness:
Definition C.4.
a. The A-expansion of L is the result of adding to L a constant for each
element of A˙.
b. The diagram of A is the set of atomic sentences and negations of atomic
sentences of the A-expansion of the language of A which are true in A.
Fact C.5. The following are equivalent [Monk, p. 356]:
a. T is model complete.
b. For every model, A, of T and every A-expansion L′ of L, the T∪L′-diagram of L
is complete.
c. If A and B are models of T , A ⊆ B, φ is a universal formula, x ∈ A, and
A  φ(x), then B  φ(x).
d. If A and B are models of T , A ⊆ B, φ is a primitive formula, x ∈ A, and
B  φ(x), then A  φ(x).
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